Anthropomorphism [pp. 120-144]

A if 7'III OP OMORPHI SaV.
Laying aside the false definitions of the philosophy of the Conditioned, and of the antinomies of the pure reason, and giving a
sensible, practical, definite meaning to the terms we use, the answer is a very simple one. Infinite personality is infinite nonsense. Personality is neither infinite nor finite. It does not in
its nature admit of measurement. There is no "more or less" to
it. No question of degree enters into it. Finiteness can be
predicated only of that which is in its nature measurable. The
assertion of the absence of limitation can be made only of that the
nature of which is such that it admits of quantitative relations,
even tho the quantity be, in tact, immeasurable. One might as
well talk of a finite sixpence or of infinite weather as of finite or
infinite personality. A person is one thing. If it exists, it is
complete in itself. You can add nothing to it to make it infinite; you can take nothing from it to make it finite. Personality belongs to that category of things of which the attribute of
the measurable, actual or potential, is not predicable. A person
is simply one kind of a unit. The principle by virtue of which
the unit subsists is unique, and can no more be called finite or
infinite than can any other single unique principle. "Infinite
personality" is a "pseud-idea" of a very weak type. The more
the agnostics ridicule it, the better, for it is high time for the
philosophy of the Infinite to learn common-sense.
But there is an immense difference between an infinite personality and an infinite person. The former is, in fact, as empty
of meaning as is the "circular triangle." But the latter phrase
has an intelligible content which may be free from all self-contradictions.
There is no suicidal confusion of concepts in the thought of
the immortality of the human soul. No new element of confusion is added if we make that existence unending a parte ante
as well. The eternal existence of the human soul-that is, of a
person-is not inconceivable.
Play as he may with the meaning of the word "concept,"
even Mr. Spencer has very definite conception when he teaches
so dogmatically the principle of the persistence of force. Yet
that is only a very positive way of stating the eternal existence
of an unchanging quantity of force. Why does eternal existence become so suddenly inconceivable when for "force" we
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