Anthropomorphism [pp. 120-144]

The Princeton review. / Volume 2, 1881

THE PR INCE TO-I RE VIER W a regular Punch and Judy show, all ultimate concepts, as the First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute, are set up and knocked down, and caused to knock each other down, until finally the puppet Ignorance strides exultant over the sawdust bodies of the slain. Mr. Spencer gives us, in the opening chapters of his "First Principles," a metaphysical circus, in which the captive concepts rise as high as the paper hoops, and then, falling back, are one after another led out of the ring. The attempt to construct a metaphysics of ultimate truths out of concepts limited by definition to the pictures of the imagination has always been a grotesque failure. The evolutional system, granting its definition of the conceivable, may be justified in its criticism of the Constructive philosophy; but it is inconsistent in subsequently bringing back, for its own use, the very concepts so ignominiously driven from the field. But we must limit our criticism here to a single part of the self-contradictory metaphysics of agnosticism-the part which bears directly upon the question under discussion. The Infinite, having been cast aside as utterly inconceivable, is brought in again mysteriously with a sufficiently definite outline to enable the agnostic to use it in his argument. "Personality and Infinity are terms expressive of ideas which are mutually incompatible. The pseud-idea'infinite person' is neither more nor less unthinkable than the pseud-idea' circular triangle.'" The terms intelligence and personality in this discussion are virtually synonymous. An intelligent First Cause must have that conscious unity which we call personality. Is the phrase "infinite person" a contradiction? The agnostic, still covered with the sawdust of the demolished concepts, boldly says, "Yes." Personality limits, determines, defines. The Infinite must cease to be infinite when it is limited, determined, defined. Then the First Cause, if infinite, cannot be a person-that is, intelligent; if a person, he cannot be infinite. Were this wretched abuse of the term "infinite" original with this school, our condemnation of their metaphysical depravity could not be too severe. Unfortunately, however, they only borrow their dogmas from some of their most prominent adversaries, and thus present the reductio ad absurdum of a popular and wide-spread metaphysics. 134

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Anthropomorphism [pp. 120-144]
Author
Phelps, M. Stuart, Ph. D.
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Page 134
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The Princeton review. / Volume 2, 1881

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"Anthropomorphism [pp. 120-144]." In the digital collection Making of America Journal Articles. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/acf4325.3-01.008. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 22, 2025.
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