What is Truth? [pp. 506-535]

The Princeton review. / Volume 6, Issue 23

What is Truth? racy, and through the use of methods more precise the altitude is established for all practical purposes, it is still not absolutely correct. This process is like the asymptotes, where there is a perpetual approach of the two lines without ever meeting. Still it is all the time plain that the facts in the case are not changed by our ignorance or knowledge. Take an example more nearly concerning practical life. Let it be proposed to establish the latitude or longitude of a given place. It is determined approximately, so that geodesy can fix upon one point in a certain locality, and another at a short distance from the first, and assert with full assurance that the desired meridian is between them, without being able, however, to say precisely where. By a better compass and more accurate trigonometrical calculations, the point may possibly be found and the absolute meridian is fixed. So, in the early survey of a territory, the lines may not, either through haste in the survey, or employment of unskillful men, be correctly laid off, and prove fruitful sources of dispute between contiguous owners. A strip of land may be in litigation, while each proprietor willingly admits that his neighbor rightfully possesses the greater part of what is considered his estate. The boundary is somewhere between the two lines claimed by the respective parties. The point is. to determine where, so that the true amount of land may be adjudged to each. In all these cases the matter in dispute is not uncertain in itself, and is made plain provided the proper appliances be employed for determining the facts. It may be said that these are examples taken from concrete mathematics, and that the uncertainty of the result arises from the elements of imperfection introduced by instruments or their manual application. But the like failures to obtain absolute accuracy is shown when the calculations are made from numerical data. For in the integral calculus there are multitudes of cases where more than one answer will satisfy the requirements of the problem. Many equations again are interminate; and there is as much room for ingenuity in fencing with the cabalistic signs of quaternions as there was with Barbara, Celarent, etc, of the schoolmen. Besides, pure mathematics, like every subject of investigation whose terms are, ex necessitate, postulates, must, as an independent science without applications, be a nullity. For, if you dissever numbers from objects, you di 524 [July,

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What is Truth? [pp. 506-535]
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Cooper, Jacob
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The Princeton review. / Volume 6, Issue 23

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"What is Truth? [pp. 506-535]." In the digital collection Making of America Journal Articles. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/acf4325.2-06.023. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 23, 2025.
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