Final Causes and Contemponeous Physiology (translated from the Revue des duex Mondes) [pp. 291-321]

320 FINAl CAUSES. [ApriI'~
As to choosing between these two hypotheses, that of a~
primordial instinct inherent in nature, or that of a supreme"
thought superior to nature, let us not forget that Aristotle,
while advocating the former, at the same time joined the'
second with it; for while he ascribed to nature a secret and
interior art, incapable of deliberation and reflection, he nevertheless held, that the mysterious action of the supreme thought
m,oved, and even molded, this artistic instinct of nature; it
was a blind impulse, without question and without consciousness, but yet determined by the sovereign cause and the irresistible attraction of " the good," which drew nature to ascend'
from form to form, from being to being, up to that supreme'
good, by creating progressively at each degree of the scale the
means of which it had need, that it might ascend higher.
Likewise in the teaching of Leibnitz, the creation of the universe by a supreme cause does not exclude second causes,
which, obeying a sort of instinct and obscure tendency, seek
for ends by appropriate means. The instinct of nature and
supreme Providence are then not in contradiction, and ought
to be reconciled in a higher doctrine. As to those who sacri
fice absolutely one of these causes, and suppress intelligence in'
the supreme being in the interest of instinct, we can not see
what advantage they can find, from the scientific point of view,
in discarding a cause which is clearly known to us, and substituting for it another which is but a word. Instinct is really'
only a hidden quality, the symbol of a void conception which'
baffles our minds. All who have tried to elucidate this conception have referred it either to mechanism or to intelligence. The blind mechanism of the elements being discarded
by common consent, intelligence remains the only known
cause to which we can ascribe the art in nature, imagination'
itself being but a form or degree of intelligence. Does this
imply that the cause of causes has an intelligence like our'
own? Does it imply that we are authorized to affirm that
there is nothfng beyond intelligence, and that the great artist
must, in the creation of his works, obey laws of which we can
not form any idea? Many metaphysicians have' thought the
contrary, and have supposed in God a series of perfections
surpassing each other, without allowing that any analogy can
represent them to us in ourselves. Perhaps the supreme rea