Recent Discussions Concerning Liberal Education [pp. 585-616]

1867.] Liberal ~ducation. 597
himsdf for the work of a smith, a carpenter, or a mason, by
swinging dumb-bells, or heaving ten-pins-an argument which,
by proving;too much, proves nothing; since, if it were sound,
all education is faulty which is not immediately professional.
We freely accord to physical science a high place in liberal
education, as a source both of useful knowledge and intellectual
discipline. We would not lower its position or narrow its
sphere in our colleges. But neither would we allow it to crowd
out or overshadow the ancient languages, or to sink them from
that regal position which makes them most of all the essential
and characteristic element in liberal education. We are quite
in favour of Scientific and Polytechnic schools, in which science
and its applications hold the chief place, while all else is subordinate and ancillary, and the ancient languages are altogether
ruled out. They are of great service to those who have not
the time or means for a full course of liberal education, as also
for those who, whether liberally educated or not, design to
qualify themsdves for engineering and other professions of
applied science. What we insist on is, that there is no substitute for the ancient languages as an integral and l9ading part
of a liberal education.
But, as preliminary to a brief discussion of this point, we
wish to clear away somewhat of the confusion of ideas which
is conspicuous among those who claim to be the special advocates of utilitari~nism, and of utilitarian studies in education.
By utility we understand that property or attribute of things
whereby they are a means 9f some good beyond themselves.
~Vhat is simply good rer Se, irrespective of its being a means to
s6me other good, may be on this account supremely excellent,
as virtue or moral goodness. Moral goodness is supremely
good in itself~ aside of its being a means to any good beyond
itself, such as happiness. And therefore it is not to be gauged
by any merely utilitarian standard. And' yet it is a means of
the highest possible good beyond itself-even the highest happiness of the rational creature. It therefore realizes all that of
which the utilitarians are in quest, who reduce virtue to a mere
means of happiness, thus debasing and destroying its very
nature, whereby alone it can be instrumental of our highest
happiness.