Reason and Faith [pp. 648-685]

Reason and Faith.
after the pungent condemnation he has uttered in regard to an
analogous view of prayer, as set forth by Kant.*
A corollary from the foregoing positions, which our author
enounces, is that "the legitimate object of a rational criticism
of revealed religion, is not to be found in the contents of that
religion, but in its evidences." Pp. 204, 205. He seems, however, to be aware that the two cannot thus be separated and
sharply contrasted. A most material part of the evidence is
the contents of revelation. It is this in-evidence of divinity that
has borne it to the hearts of God's people of every age and
nation in demonstration of the Spirit and of power. It ismbecause they hear a voice therein speaking as man never spake,
and see a radiance of divinity not paralleled in the material
creation or the light of nature, that they are conscious of vastly
stronger evidence that the Bible is the word, than that the
material world is the work of God.
It is not merely miracles in contrast to the " contents" of
revelation, but these very contents, too, that attest its Divine
origin. MAr. Mansel says, "The primary and direct inquiry
which human reason is entitled to make concerning a professed
revelation is-how far does it tend to promote or hinder the
moral discipline of man. It is but a secondary and indirect
question, and one very liable to mislead, to ask how far it is
compatible with the Infinite Goodness of God." P. 210. With all
deference, this seems to us a baz-poev,rpor7EOV. It is because we
see the impress of the "Infinite Goodness of God" upon the
Scriptures, that we believe them "given by inspiration of God,
and thus profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for
instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be per
* "Let us hear then the philosopher's rational explanation, upon this assumption, of the duty of prayer. It is a mere superstitious delusion, he tells
us, to consider prayer as service addressed to God, and as a means of obtain.
ing his favour. The true purpose of the act is not to alter or affectin any way
God's relation towards ia; but only to quicken our own moral sentiments, by
keeping alive within us the idea of God as a moral Lawgiver. He, therefore,
neither admits the duty unconditionally, nor rejects it entirely; but leaves it
optional with men to adopt that or any other means, by which, in their own
particular case, this moral end may be best promoted;-as if any moral benefit
couldpossibly accruefrom the habitual exercise of an act of conscious self-decep tion." P. 56.
VOL. XXXII.-NO. IV. 87
1860.]
681