Reason and Faith [pp. 648-685]

Reason and Faith.
man's arguments; but only as it is also beyond the reach of
his feelings and volitions. We cannot indeed reason to the
existence of an Infinite Cause from the presence of finite effects,
nor contemplate the infinite in a finite mode of knowledge;
but neither can we feel the infinite in the form of a finite affection, nor discern it as a law of finite action." P. 117. "The
very conception of a moral nature is in itself the conception of
a limit." P. 127. As to "a partial, but not a total knowledge
of the Infinite and Absolute," we are told, of course, "the supposition refutes itself." P. 97.
If this series of dialectic feats tires the reader, this is not
our fault. It is still more trying to the writer to transcribe,
analyze, and refute them. Similar extracts might be multiplied at pleasure. We have thought proper to quote thus
largely, in order to let the author speak for himself on the
most fundamental point in his treatise-a question of intrinsic
and acknowledged difficulty. We have thus before us the
destructive portion of his theory. The constructive side will
remain to be considered, when we have disposed of this.
Those who are familiar with German transcendental modes of
thought and expression, will recognize little that is new in
these portentous demonstrations, which make it the prime
function of human reason to commit suicide. The novelty lies
in the use to which they are put by Mr. Mansel. He has
undertaken to utilize modes of thinking heretofore employed in
behalf of Pantheism or Atheism, and the demolition or corruption of Christianity in order to neutralize their own venom,
and parry their own assaults upon our faith. He shows our
supposed enemy to be our faithful and invincible ally. It is
indeed true, according to Kant, Hegel, and their followers,
that the mind of man cannot think of God as Infinite, Absolute, and First Cause, without running into all manner of
contradictions and absurdities. But this need not alarm us.
It proves not Pantheism or Atheism, but the utter incapacity
of reason or philosophy to grasp religious truths at all, or
exercise any critical judgment about them. Of course, all
rationalistic or philosophic objections are undermined. For
the very reason itself which makes them, is undermined, quoad
hoc, and proved incapable of thought in the premises. This
VOL. XXXII.-NO. IV. 85
1860.]
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