Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy of the Conditioned [pp. 472-510]

Philosophy of the Conditioned.
atoms, distinguish the point of origin of force, the polarity, the
arrangement; so that like some arithmetical prodigy, who
intuitively knows the nature of numbers, and understands
their results in the most complicated combinations, we might
tell with mathematical precision the precise nature (as intelligent or unintelligent), the organization, action and interaction
of all the forces in a given mass of matter. Sensations give us
the relation of matter to us, but the intuitive perceptions give
us knowledge of matter as it is in itself, permanent, extensionoccupying substance; exactly as it would be if we did not
perceive it-exactly as it is when we do not perceive it.
This knowledge is partial indeed, but pure.
3~. As to our knowledge of mind. It does not appear that
the distinction of subject and object in consciousness of self is
at all like the phenomenal relations of two masses of matter.
On the contrary, consciousness assures us that the same indivisible unit is both subject and object; that we know this unit
as it is in itself-a person; that we know our mental states
exactly as they are; and that we have power over them; and
that they have a positive quality as right and wrong. Consciousness is not a distorting lens, it is clear light; conscience
is not a liar, nor a prejudiced witness, it is "the voice of
God." In regard to all these points we have knowledge,
partial indeed, but pure.
4~. Size does not prevent knowledge from being pure, or
continued existence. The purity of our knowledge of extension,
for example, is not affected by the fact that we have not
examined all extension, nor by the fact that we did not know
it a century ago. What we do know we may know purely,
though there is much more to know, and though it may change
in an instant. Any inability to follow through and complete a
knowledge of the infinite does not render less pure the knowledge which we do attain. The infinite God acts in finite
relations; the knowledge of him which we have from these
acts is not less pure, because we do not know all.
The fundamental principle of lIi,inilton's own doctrine of the
conditioned may be stated as follows in his own words. All
that is conceivable in thought lies in the conditioned interval
between two unconditioned contradictory extremes or poles, viz.
the absolute and the infinite; each of which is altogether incon
1860.]
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