Harrison on the Greek Prepositions [pp. 661-668]

:Barrison on the Greek Prepositions.
sition itself," and alludes to "some examples of the use of 7rc
and aOp with the dative, of which he remarks, that in such in stances "alone it may be allowable to say, that the case
depends upon, or, as it is sometimes expressed, is governed
by the preposition." Thus, the adverb and preposition are
regarded as both equally belonging to the verb, with this differ encei that the preposition shows its direction and the adverb
its other modifications.
As respects the meaning of the different cases, the author
holds that the idea of special reference lies at the basis of the
genitive, that of limitation, of the accusative, and that of ulti mate object, means or place of the dative, while of these rela tions the prepositions are employed to distinguish the manifold
varieties. The second and larger part of the work consists of
a detailed treatment of the prepositions one by one with a view
to ascertain and classify the various modifications of their
meaning.
In the main, Dr. Harrison's generalization is just, yet there is
a point where it seems to us to come short. Why was it deemed
necessary to subdivide the dative any more than the genitive?
The philosophy of the language is as harmonious in one as the
other. To make two or three cases out of either of them, after
the example of the Latin, Polish or Sanscrit, is to impose upon
the Greek the defective generalization of languages, which
were the outgrowth of less comprehensive and less subtle thinking. It is also inconsistent with the spirit of Dr. Harrison's
own work. We cannot regard the dative as merely a common
termination upon which two or three different cases have accidentally fallen. For if that were so in one declension, it would
be very strange should it happen in all three. It is beyond a
doubt that the Greek mind intended the dative to be one. On
this point, it seems to us that Jelf's theory covers the true
doctrine of the Greek language. "A sentence expresses a
thought or succession of notions, standing in certain relations
and order to each other." To the principal notion any other
"must stand in one of three relations; it must either have preceded it, or be implied in it as part of it, or must follow it;
whence these three relations may be called antecedent, co-inci VOL. xxx.-No. Iv. 85
1sss.]
665