Remarks on the Princeton Review [pp. 306-347]

Nature of the Proposed Theory.
other'is a truism. The one admits of discussion, the other can
be refuted, as a means of reconciling creeds, only by stating it.
The one is this, viz. that right feeling may express itself in
diverse, conflicting, and therefore in some cases, wrong intellectual forms. The other is, that figurative language is not to be
interpreted literally. It is the adroit or unconscious interchange of these entirely different forms of his theory, that gives
at once plausibility and confusion to his discourse. The frequent and sudden transition from a principle which no one
denies, to one which no orthodox man admits, bewilders and
deludes his readers. When startled by the fell sweep of his
theory in one of its forms, he suddenly turns to them the other,
and shows them how perfectly simple and harmless an affair it
is. We shall endeavour very briefly to prove, first, that the
author does present his theory in both of the forms above stated;
and secondly, that in the one form it is false and destructive,
and in the other nugatory.
But what is the theory which teaches that right feeling may
express itself in diverse, and even in wrong intellectual forms?
The sermon does not present any elaborate exposition or philosophical discussion of it. This was not to be expected in a
popular discourse. In order, however, to be properly understood, it is necessary that it should be exhibited somewhat in
detail. We do not mean tb attribute to Professor Park any
thing more than the-principle itself, as above stated;'we do not
wish to be understood aseven insinuating that he holds either
its adjuncts or its consequents. The doctrine is, substantially
this. Religion consists essentially in feeling. It is not a form
of knowledge, because in that case it could be taught like any
other system of knowledge; and the more learned, on religious
subjects, a man is, the more religion he would have. Much less
can it consist in willing or acting, because there is no moral
excellence either in volition or outward action, except as expressive of feeling. Religion must, therefore, have its seat in the
feelings. There is in man a religious sentiment, a sense of
dependence, a consciousness of relation to God. This gives rise
to a persuasion that God is, and that we stand in manifold relations to him, and he to us. This is faith, i. e. a persuasion
which arises out of feeling, and which derives from that source
1851.]
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