Three Absurdities of Certain Modern Theories of Education [pp. 265-292]

Moral and Social Influences.
period of seemingly rapid advance, involves the soul that would
think in utter confusion, bringing along with it as its natural
consequences perplexity, discouragement, the painful sense of
loose and chaotic knowledge, ever enfeebling, as it bewilders
the intellect, and thus rendering it more and more incapable of
any earnest and vigorous effort.
But there is another department of our general subject, which
is not to be overlooked. The moral and social influences of the
two courses of education are to be considered, as well as their
mere intellectual bearings. The one, as we have endeavoured
to show, actually enfeebles the mind, but at the same time, fills
it with a vain conceit of independence and originality even in
the very alphabet of knowledge. The other, whilst it strength ens, at the same time inculcates a docile humility. It in spires true confidence in itself, whilst it cherishes also the
humane or fraternal, instead of the individualizing, selfish spirit.
The soul is led to feel an enhanced interest in its acquisitions as
connected with the previous common stock of a past humanity.
It rejoices in any additions it may itself make, by way of discovery, as deriving their value mainly from their relation to
such a former knowledge of the race, and as actually growing
out of it after the law of a natural and rational progress. Instead of finding gratification in the narrow and selfish idea of
thinking of itself, and for itself, it has a most exquisite pleasure
in the consciousness of a communion of thought with the wise,
and good, and sober-minded of all ages.
With those who maintain the view against which we contend,
education is mainly and pre-eminently individualizing. At least
such is their claim. They boast of this as being not only its
peculiar result, but also its peculiar merit. The knowledge
acquired, the strength of mind, the mental habits, or the intellectual and moral position, are of little or no account per se,
when compared with their fancied originality, or with what they
would style the development of the strongly marked independent, and free thinking individual character.
Now the first and most obvious objection to this, arises from
the fact of its creating for the soul another interest, controlling,
if not wholly superseding that which should ever be highest and
strongest —the interest of truth. This is something more than
1851.]
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