Essays on the Foundation and Publication of Opinions, and on other Subjects. Essays of the Pursuit of Truth, on the Progress of Knowledge, and the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectation. [pp. 394-428]

and Pursuit of Truth.
exists in the universe, none but an atheist will deny; and
that the Creator of the wxvorld will never choose so to interpose
as to give a striking evidence of his power aud providence,
is what no one has any right to assert. What would be
our conclusions in regard to this matter, if we were left to
reason on the subject, may be doubtful; but when facts are
seen by ourselves, or reported to us by a sufficient number of
faithful and intelligent witnesses, there remains no rational
alternative, but to give due credit to what is thus clearly made
known. Multitudes of events which are not miraculous, are,
prior to experience, altogether improbable; but when they actually occur before our eyes, or when hundreds of disinterestedt persons assure us that they have witnessed them, we
never make the abstract improbability of their occurrence a
reason for disbelieving them. The very same principle applies to miracles. There may be, to our apprehension, a
great improbability that the laws of nature will ever be suspended by divine power, but when we ourselves see events by
which these laws are contravened, or, when a sufficient number of witnesses agree in attesting such facts, we cannot but
receive as true, what we see with our own eyes, andi what is
reported by men of truth and intelligence. What kind and
degree of testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, or a
real deviation from the laws of nature, is a thing not to be ascertained by abstract reasoning; but when the evidence is exhibited,and the circumstances of any particular fact understood,
no man needs to be informed what he should believe or disbelieve. Indeed, he has no choice in the case, if he only
suffers the evidence to be fairly presented to his mind; for, as
this writer has abundantly shown, belief in such a ease is involuntary, whatever may be said or reasoned, abstractly, respecting the impossibility of believing in a fact which involves
a departure from the course of nature; yet, if such a fact be
clearly and repeatedly presented to our sight; or if it be attested by hundreds and thousands of persons who have no
conceivable motive to assert what is false in the case, we
should be constrained in such case to yield our assent; and
the man who should in such circumstances, declare that he
disbelieved what he saw with his eyes, or xvas attested by
such a number of veracious witnesses, ought to be suspected of
falsifying his own convictions, rather than disbelieving his
own senses, or rejecting the testimony of a multitude of sensible and impartial witnesses.
When this author asserts, that our belief in testimony arises
425