Essays on the Foundation and Publication of Opinions, and on other Subjects. Essays of the Pursuit of Truth, on the Progress of Knowledge, and the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectation. [pp. 394-428]

The Formation of Opinions,
would be, that there was an extraordinary cause in operation,
to which the observed effect must be ascribed. No one would
be so foolish as to suppose, that if heat operated according to
the laws which usually regulate it, and no other cause wvas concerned( in the effect, that ice would( remain unmelted for an
hour, ill such a temperature. In all cases where an effect different from the ordinary one in the same circumstances takes
place, we are instinctively led to the supposition of tle operation
of an extraordinary cause, although we may be entirely ignlorant of its nature. But when a real deviation from the laws
of nature is observed, the rational conclusion is, that the
power of God must have been interposed; since none has
power to control or suspend the laws of nature but he that establishe(l them: and such an event is properly called a miracle.
Now, although it requires strong evidence to satisfy an impartial mind of the existence of a miracle, the difficulty
of believing in such a fact, does not in the least depend upon
the principle assutmed by the Essayist; namely, that such an
event implies a violation of the uniformity of causation: for
as has been shown, that idea never enters the mind of any
one. The difficulty in believing in a miracle is owing to the
presumption, arising from common experience, that the laws
of nature will remain the same; and from the circumstance
that we may never before have witnessed an event of this
kind. But the thought thaz the thing is impossible to divine
power, would never be likely to enter into any unsophisticated
mind; and nothing would be requisite to produce the fullest
conviction of its truth, but the opportunity of observing it in
circumstances favourable to a distinct view of the fect. And
when the miracle is attended by such evidence as commands
assent, such as that of our own senses, no difficulty of crediting the fact would ever be experienced, on account of the uniformity of caulsation, or on any other account whatever.
If the preceding observations are correct, as it relates to
facts which fall under the observation of the senses, the same
conclusions will be true in regard to facts made known to us
by testimony, of the strongest kind. It is true, this writer
seems to maintain, that there is always some uncertainty
in the information derived from this source. "The causes
of testimony,"' says he, "'or those considerations which
operate on the minds of the witnesses, cannot always be
ascertained; and as we are uncertain as to the causes in operation, we cannot be certain of the effects; we cannot be
sure that the circumstances of the witnesses are such as
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