Essays on the Foundation and Publication of Opinions, and on other Subjects. Essays of the Pursuit of Truth, on the Progress of Knowledge, and the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectation. [pp. 394-428]

and Pursuit of Truth.
the mind, between these conflicting and equally balanced evi dences, must remain in a state of perfect neutrality; neither
believing nor disbelieving the fact. And this effect must take
place, however frequently we might witness the faict, or what ever number of persons should concur with us, as to the na ture of the fact observed. For howvever certain we might be,
that we saw the ice unmelted, yet no certainty from the evi dence of sense can be greater than that which we have that
the same causes will always produce the same effects.
Thus would these philosophers, by their abstract and meta physical reasonings, persuade us to disbelieve even the evidence
of our own senses. It is true, as was observed], that neither
this writer nor Mr. Hume has pushed the argument to this
consequence, nor do they seem to have been aware of it; but
we think it must be evident to every impartial mind, that the
difficulty which they have so forcibly and confidently presented, is as applicable to the evidence of the senses, as to
that of testimony. But whether, if wve should witness a fact
in direct contrariety to the known and established laws of nature, we should hesitate to believe it, is a thing not to be
determined by abstract reasoning on general principles;
every man is capable of deciding it for himself. Indeed, the
effect which any kind of evidence will have on the mind can
only be known by experience; and on this ground we may
assert, that what a man plainly and repeatedly sees he will believe. If any plain, sensible man should see ice remain unmelted at 200 degrees of Fahrenheit, he would not need to
refer to the uniformity of causation, or any other abstract
principle, before he gave his assent. He would, indeed, esteem it an extraordinary phenomnenon, for which he could not
account; and he might at first be ready to suppose that there
was something deceptious in the appearance; but if, after repeated and thorough examinations, he should find that it was
a reality; and, especially, if he found that the same impl)ression was made on a multitude of other persons, he could not
do otherwise than believe the fact to be, as it appeared to his
senses. And such an observer would experience no difficulty
in giving his assent, from any equipoise of conflictin,, evidence, which might be supposed to exist. Indeed, if such a
fact were witnessed by a dozen intelligent men, not one of
them would conclude that there wvas an infringement of the uLniformity of causation; or that the same effects did not always follow the same causes; but the supposition of every one of them
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