Essays on the Foundation and Publication of Opinions, and on other Subjects. Essays of the Pursuit of Truth, on the Progress of Knowledge, and the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectation. [pp. 394-428]

and Pursuit of Truth.
confine Him perpetually, to one mode of operation. There
are, indeed, strong reasons why the laws of nature should be
uniform in their ordinary operation; but there may also exist
strong reasons for an occasional deviation from the common
course: and the same wisdom which dictated the establishment
of such regular laws, may also dictate, that, for the accomplishment of special objects of importance, it may be highly proper to deviate from them. And as it relates to this point, it matters not whether we adopt the theory, that the operation of the
laws of nature is the agency of God himself, according to rules
which he has established, or maintain, that in the formation
of the universe, he communicated certain powers and active
properties to inanimate nature; for as, in the first case, it is
evident, that God who is infinitely free and sovereign, can, at
pleasure, change his own operation; so, in the other, it is
equally obvious, that he who communicated certain powers to
matter, is able, according to his will, to control and suspend
the operation of these second causes. The conclusion is, therefore, most manifest, that there is nothing absurd or impossible
in the idea of a deviation from the sequence of causes, as they
ordinarily take place in the regular course of the laws of nature. Whether, in fact, there are any such events, is a matter not to be determined by any reasoning on general principles,
but in the manner in which we come to the knowledge of all
facts, by experience, observation, and testimony. And all we
have aimed at in the preceding remarks, is to show, that there
exists no such presumption against facts of this particular kind,
as would render it unreasonable to credit them, provided they
are accompanied by such evidence as satisfies the mind of an
impartial inquirer.
The question which we now have to discuss is precisely the
same as that treated by Mr. Hume, in his celebrated Essay on
Miracles. The author, whose work we are considering, attempts to reduce us precisely to the same dilemma, as did Mr.
Hume his readers, by a complete equipoise of evidence. The
case is thus stated: A fact is supposed to be attested by such a
force of testimony, that there is nothing wanting to render it
satisfactory; the witnesses are intelligent; of known integrity;
would suffer injury by a false statement; are sufficiently numerous; and are harmonious and consistent in the testimony
which they deliver. Such testimony, it is acknowledged, if
it stood alone, would be competent to command our unwavering assent: but a counteraction may arise from the nature of
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