Essays on the Foundation and Publication of Opinions, and on other Subjects. Essays of the Pursuit of Truth, on the Progress of Knowledge, and the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectation. [pp. 394-428]

and Pursuit of Truth.
served usually to take place, in similar circumstances; let us
only suppose, as in the case cited, that there is some extraor dinary cause at work; and while we make this supposition,
we do not deny the uniformity of causation, but "proceed on
the assumption, that if the causes had been the same, the ef fects must have been similar."
Having cleared the subject of this difficulty, we are now
prepared to examine the question which is really in controver sy, and which is no other than this, " Whether an event which
implies a deviation from the sequence of causes, or from the
established laws of nature, can be proved by any testimony,
however strong?" There is still another question, however,
which must be settled with this author, befoibre we can proceed to the main point; and that is, "Is such an event, as involves a real deviation from the laws of nature, possible?"
We certainly should not have judged it necessary to discuss
this question with a theist, —and such we understand this writer professes to be-were it not, that in a subsequent chapter
of this same Essay, he roundly asserts, that all such events
are impossible. His words, (p. 212,) are, "An event is impossible which contradicts our experience, or which implies,
that the same causes have produ'ced different effects. Thus,
when we pronounce, that it is impossible for a piece of ice
to remain in the midst of burning coals without being dissolved, our conclusion involves a complete knowledge of this
particular effect of fire on ice, as well as the assumption that
what has taken place in our own experience must always have
occurred under precisely the same circumstances. If I am
not greatly deceived, the acutest reasoner, the closest thinker,
the most subtile analyser of words, will find himself unable to
produce any other meaning of the term impossible, than that
which is here assigned to it." Now, this definition of the
word, impossible, is passing strange to us. What! will this
author allow nothing to the power of God? Will he deny to
the Creator the power of suspending his own laws, which he
has impressed on the universe? Is it true, that the Almighty
cannot prevent the melting of a piece of ice in the fire?
Surely, no theist will be so insane as to maintain this.
Where, then, is'the impossibility of events occurring which
are deviations from the sequence of natural causes?
The author, upon a review of what he has here written
concerning possibility and impossibility, seems to have felt
some dubiety about the correctness of his definition; for, not
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