Essays on the Foundation and Publication of Opinions, and on other Subjects. Essays of the Pursuit of Truth, on the Progress of Knowledge, and the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectation. [pp. 394-428]

and Pursuit of Truth.
And, in the commencement, we would remark, that we
do not, in the least, question the truth of the general pro position, which lies at the foundation of this author's argu ment. We do admit most readily and fully, "that the same
causes produce the same effects;" and this is so generally ac knowledged, that the pains taken in this Essay to render it
evident, are, in our opinion, wholly unnecessary. This
general principle does not involve, in any degree, the
point at issue. But while we are so ready to concede this
first principle, we are no how disposed to yield what this
author seems to consider the same thing; namely, "that
there never has been, nor can be, any deviation from the established laws of nature.". Here, in our opinion, lies the
whole fallacy of the reasoning in this Essay. The ingenious author rightly lays it down as a first principle, "that
causation is uniform, or, that the same causes will uniformly
produce the same effects;" but when he asserts, that to believe in a deviation from "the admitted causes of nature, is a
logical absurdity," he places the matter on entirely different
ground. To understand this matter distinctly, let us recur
to the fact which he supposes, that some one should "assert
that he had exposed a cubic inch of ice to a temperature of
200 degrees of Fahrenheit, and that at the expiration of an
hour it had retained its solidity." This is the instance which
he gives to illustrate his views of the uniformity of causation.
This is the fact which he asserts could never be rendered credible "by any possible proofs of the truth of testimony."
The first question which occurs in regard to this case is, does
the truth of the fact supposed violate the general principle
of the uniformity of causation? We say it does not. No
man who believed such a fact would suppose that the cause
was in this case the same, as that which commonly met our
observation in similar external circumstances. Every man
would conclude, on observing such a fact, that some extraordinary cause, not usually witnessed, was in operation. To
believe that the same cause without any change, produces different effects, at different times, is one thing; but to believe,
that while external circumstances are similar, an invisible and
extraordinary cause is at work to produce an effect different
from what is usual, is quite another thing. The artful confounding of these two things, which are manifestly distinct, is
the ground of all the specious plausibility which the reasoning
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