Essays on the Foundation and Publication of Opinions, and on other Subjects. Essays of the Pursuit of Truth, on the Progress of Knowledge, and the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectation. [pp. 394-428]

The Formation of Opinions,
dent, that the same cause uniformly produces the same effect,
it must be equally true, in regard to the past, present, and
future. The difference of time makes no difference whatever
in our belief of the identity of the effect produced. It is a
circumstance which is not perceived to have the least influentce on the matter.
It seems to us, therefore, that no credit is due to this author
for the distinct and particular application of the general principle of the uniformity of causation to past events. Whatthe
author has said, in the fourth and fifth chapters, in illustration
of the application of this principle to moral, as well as physical causes, is more important, because, in relation to this point,
there is more scepticism prevalent, as it respects the application of the general principle. Indeed, there are many, and
some of no mean name, who will not agree that the same laws
of causation which are acknowledged to be true in physics, are
at all applicable to mind. But to us it appears, that what this
writer has here said, and what he has more fully argued in
the ninth chapter, on the subject of necessity, is entirely just.
That every thing which is produced must have an adequate
cause, is as true of mental, as of physical phenomena; and it
is equally certain, that the same causes will uniformly produce
the same effects, in the moral, as in the natural world. To
suppose the contrary, is to confound the clearest principles
of reason and common sense; and to rush at once into the region of absurdity. If any thing, whether a thought, a volition, or the most evanescent emotion, can take place without
any causation, we cannot see why, on the same principles, the
universe might not start into existence without a cause.
Reason is not more shocked with the one absurdity than the
other. And if a moral cause could be supposed to be followed
by one effect at one time, and by a different effect at another,
the cause being precisely the same in both cases, it would as
directly impugn the principle of the uniformity of causation,
as if fire at one time should burn paper, and at another produce no effect on it, although as fully subjected to its power.
The reasons why moral causes are commonly thought to be
less certain in their operation than those which are physical,
are satisfactorily given by our author.
But we now proceed to the discussion of the main point,
which we have undertaken to examine. And that no injustice may be done to the ingenious author, on whom we remark, we will cite, at some length, his own words:
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