Essays on the Foundation and Publication of Opinions, and on other Subjects. Essays of the Pursuit of Truth, on the Progress of Knowledge, and the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectation. [pp. 394-428]

The Formation of Opinions,
ledged, or all idea of moral obligation, and of a difference between virtue and vice, must be relinquished.
And, finally, this theory destroys itself; for if a man be
responsible for none of his opinions, then he is not responsible
for believing that men are responsible for their opinions. Be
it an error; yet, no man is culpable merely for entertaining
an erroneous opinion. We may, therefore, innocently believe that the opinions of men are proper objects of moral approbation or condemnation. Thus we arrive at the very
point which these philosophers have so assiduously endeavoured to avoid. Nor can this consequence be evaded by resorting to the principle, that we are accountable for the impartiality and diligence with which we form our opinions, on
important practical subjects; for, if we entertain the opinion
that truth is unimportant or unattainable, there can exist no
moral obligation on us, to use diligence or exercise impartiality,
in its investigation.
We are fully persuaded, therefore, that no principle more
hostile to the best interests of truth and sound morality, has
been for a long time inculcated; and coming from men whose
opinions have acquired so great influence with the intelligent
public, and being defended by writers of so much apparent
candor and philosophical acumen, as the author of these Essays, there is just cause for alarm to the friends of morality;
to say nothing of the bearing of these doctrines, on divine
revelation. And what adds to the danger is, that the poison
is so subtle that few readers perceive it, until they have imbibed the deleterious potion. We are persuaded, that the
publishers and venders of these "Essays" in this country,
had no idea that they were putting principles into circulation,
the tendency of which is to subvert all sound morality.
The remaining principle which we propose to examine, is
not less important, than that already considered. It is,
"'whether any kind or degree of testimony is sufficient to
establish a fact which is a deviation from the known laws of
nature?" This subject is treated, in the second of the little
volumes, which stand at the head of this article. The Essay
in which it is discussed, is entitled, " The uniformity of
causation explaining the fundamental principle of all
evidence and expectation.
The ingenious author commences his Essay, by laying down
the necessity of admitting some truths which do not depend
for their proof on logical deduction. In this he agrees with
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