Essays on the Foundation and Publication of Opinions, and on other Subjects. Essays of the Pursuit of Truth, on the Progress of Knowledge, and the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectation. [pp. 394-428]

(find Pursuit of Truth.
tion is remarkably close. These philosophic men having come
to a conclusion, unfavourable to the claims of Christianity,
the religion of the country where they dwell, feel that they
are, in consequence of their free opinions, subjected to a cer tain degree of obloquy, as unbelievers: they therefore labour
to remove all ground of reproach, by maintaining that, in no
case, is any man responsible for his belief or opinions. But
they gain very little by this principle, if it should be conceded
to them; for, they admit, that every man is deeply responsible
for the manner in which he deals with evidence; or for the
sincerity, diligence, and impartiality, with which he examines
into the evidence of truth. It matters not whether censure
falls upon a man for holding a particular opinion, or for the
corrupt feelings which led him to adopt it; the consequences
will be precisely the same, as it relates to public opinion, in
relation to the character of the individual. The man who
has arrived at false opinions by unfaithful dealing with evidence, is just as guilty, and will be as justly condemned, as
if our moral disapprobation was confined to the act of assent,
by which he adopts certain opinions of his own.
It does not appear to us, therefore, that any thing is gained
by the new theory of ethics, in preventing censure or persecution, for the sake of difference in opinion. It might, upon
the same principles, and with just as much plausibility, be
argued, that no external actions were proper objects of approbation or condemnation; since, considered separately from
the motives producing them, actions can possess no moral
quality. But, if it is at the same time admitted, that men are
accountable for the motives from which their actions proceed,
it amounts to the same thing as if the moral quality attached
to the action. Just so in regard to belief or opinion, however it may be represented as no proper object of moral consideration; yet, if the state of mind from which it results,
is moral, it comes in the end to the very same thing. Indeed, both as it relates to opinions and actions, when we
speak of them as censurable or commnendable, we include the
motive or disposition from which the action or opinion flows.
If a man believes his neighbour to be a vile hypocrite, and
ascribes all his most virtuous actions to base motives, not
because there is any good evidence that this is the fact, but
because he has long cherished hatred towards him, in the
view of every impartial mind he is criminal for the uncharitable opinion which he entertains. This must be acknow
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