Essays on the Foundation and Publication of Opinions, and on other Subjects. Essays of the Pursuit of Truth, on the Progress of Knowledge, and the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectation. [pp. 394-428]

The Formation of Opinions,
in regard to it; because, however honest, diligent, and impar tial the person might be, there would exist just the same pro bability of arriving at an erroneous, as a true opinion. Upon
this principle, the high moral obligation of searching after
truth, on which this writer so forcibly and frequently insists,
is utterly subverted; for when men have no probability of
finding truth rather than error, there is no moral obligation to
pursue it. And this involves the very absurd opinion, that,
generally, truth is accompanied with no better nor clearer
evidence, than error. Now, if there be such a thing as truth,
its characteristic must be, that it possesses evidence of being
truth; and error is destitute of the evidence of truth. We have
admitted, indeed, that relatively to the situation of particular
minds, the evidence of truth may be so concealed or involved,
that it is not perceived; and error, in such cases, may seem to
be more probable than truth, even when there is a sincere desire
to come at the truth; and these we are willing to consider as
exceptions to the general rule. But, commonly, the evidence of truths which have any relation to moral conduct, is
sufficiently within the reach of the honest inquirer; and if
he adopts error, the reason must be, because he has been wanting in diligence, attention, or impartiality. He is, therefore, in
all such cases responsible for his belief, as much as he can be
for any thing; and if this is not, in any case, a proper object
of moral approbation or condemnation, then, as was before
shown, nothing is. For, as to the true point on which moral responsibility rests, we cannot but think, that the author
enters into unnecessary refinement. Indeed, it is not correct
that volition, taken in philosophic strictness, is the sole object
of our moral approbation or disapprobation. We have already seen, that the moral character of the volition depends
on the motive, and the internal motive or affection which
prompts to volition gives it its moral character; and the nature
of such an affection in a rational, accountable creature, is intimately and inseparably connected with belief or opinion.
When men exercise their moral faculty in judging of the moral character of actions, they never enter into these nice distinctions.'I'hey take the action with all the preceding and
accompanying circumstances, and form a correct opinion,
without metaphysical discrimination. Thus, an immoral action, if you separate it from the volition which produced it,
has no moral character; and the volition, considered separately from the quality of the motive, is no object of praise or
blame; and the motive could not be what it is, unless the
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