Essays on the Foundation and Publication of Opinions, and on other Subjects. Essays of the Pursuit of Truth, on the Progress of Knowledge, and the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectation. [pp. 394-428]

and Pursuit of Truth.
effect of an erroneous persuasion or opinion. As, suppose I
have through prejudice taken up the opinion, that some man
is the enemy of God, and a great obstacle to the progress of
his Church, and that by putting him out of the way, I should
be doing service to God and the public; is it not manifest, that
if there be responsibility any where, opinion or belief must
come in for its share, since this is the true origin of the culpable action? But if the opinion is innocent, so is the feeling
which flows from it; so is the volition prompted by this motive; and so is the action which is the result of the voluntary
purpose. Hence it is evident, that the consequence of this
doctrine is the subversion of all distinction between right and
wrong; between virtue and vice.
The ingenious author admits that opinion is, sometimes, the
effect of voluntary states of the mind, and, on that account,
it has become often the object of moral approbation or disapprobation; but this, he thinks, is not exactly correct, but is
transferring the moral character of the action, from the volition to which it properly belongs, to the belief or opinion, to
which it does not appertain. But even admitting the propriety of considering that which is the criterion of the moral
character of our volitions as the proper object of praise or
blame, he does not think that our belief or opinions would,
even in this case, be the proper object of condemnation or
approbation: "Opinions," says he, "are not indications of
any voluntary acts; they furnish no evidence of the fairness
or unfairness of investigation; since the most opposite results, the most contrary opinions, may arise from the same
degree of impartiality and application." Here, in our opinion, is the radical error of the moral system of the ingenious
author of these Essays. He seems to receive it as a principle,
that, in no case, where there is diversity of opinion, the evidence of truth is so clear, that none can or do mistake respecting it, except through prejudice, inattention, or some
want of fidelity and impartiality, in the mind of him who falls
into error. There may, indeed, be truths, and truths of a
moral nature too, so situated as to evidence, in relation to
the minds of different persons, that in the exercise of equal
diligence and impartiality, men may come to opposite results,
or embrace different opinions; but that this is generally the
case, we hold to be a practical error of great magnitude. If
this were indeed the fact, then the pursuit of truth would be
nugatory; then there could be no duty incumbent on any man
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