Essays on the Foundation and Publication of Opinions, and on other Subjects. Essays of the Pursuit of Truth, on the Progress of Knowledge, and the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectation. [pp. 394-428]

The Formation of Opinions,
depend for their character on their opinions, cannot be reprehensible. It cannot be morally wrong to act in accordance
with an innocent opinion. If there is no culpability in a
man's believing that he may take away the life of an old
miser, there cannot be any criminality in his doing the deed,
which he has persuaded himself is innocent. Thus, this doetrine leads to the subversion of all moral distinctions.
But the ingenious author admits, and strenuously maintains, that man is responsible for his volitions, as the universal opinion of men ever has been that for our voluntary states
of mind we are accountable. Yet it is difficult to understand
how my volitions can be wrong, when the opinions on which
they often absolutely depend, are free from all blame. Suppose a man to be fully persuaded in his mind, that private
property was an unauthorized invasion of the common rights
of mankind; if he might entertain this opinion with perfect
innocence, how could it be wrong to act agreeably to this
persuasion, and to appropriate to his own use the property of
another? If, while the opinion is innocent, the action which
accords with it is immoral, then, the consequence would follow, that a man might not do what he innocently believes is
right.
It is impossible to separate voluntary actions from belief or
opinions; if the former are culpable, so are the latter, on which
they depend for their character. Voluntary action owes its
moral quality to the motive by which it is prompted. If the
motive be pure and good, the volition is so also; and if the
motive be evil, so is the voluntary action. Separate the volition from the motive which produces it, and you destroy the
moral character of the action. A man resolves to kill his
neighbour. This purpose is a voluntary state of the mind,
and is wicked; but why? because it is prompted by a malignant feeling; but suppose that this purpose was produced
by nothing else but the desire of self-preservation, or the desire to protect the innocent from lawless violence; who does
not see that the same volition may be good or bad, according
to the motive by which it is produced? Well, if the volition
receives its complexion from the motive or affection producing
it, then certainly praise or blame attaches to motives, as
much as to volitions, But these internal motives or affections
depend for their existence and character, on the opinions
which have obtained a firm hold of the mind. The mnalignanit feeling which produces the purpose to kill a man, is the
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