The New Divinity Tried [pp. 278-304]

The New Divinity Tried.
same'time he was made, is to affirm a contradiction, or what
is inconsistent with the very nature of righteousness," goes
on to remark, "with respect to this, I would observe, that it
consists in a notion of virtue quite inconsistent with the nature
of things and the common notions of mankind." That it is
thus inconsistent with the nature of things, he proceeds to
prove. In the course of this proof we find such assertions as
the following: "'The act of choosing what is good is no
further virtuous, than it proceeds from a good principle, or
virtuous disposition of mind. Which supposes that a virtuous
disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice,
and that, therefore, it is not necessary' there should first be
thought, reflection, and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition." "There is no necessity that all virtuous
dispositions or affections should be the effect of choice. And
so, no such supposed necessity can be a good objection against
such a disposition being natural, or from a kind of instinction,
implanted in the mind at its creation."* Again, p. 409, in
showing Dr. Taylor's inconsistency, he says, "If Adam must
choose to be righteous before he was righteous," then'Dr.
Taylor's scheme involves a contradiction, &c. A mode of
expression which clearly shows the position against which he
argues. Again, "Human nature must be created with some
dispositions; a disposition to relish some things as good and
amiable, and to be averse to other things as odious and disagreeable *' * * *. But if it had any concreated dispositions at all, they must have been right or wrong;" and he then
says, if man had at first a disposition to find happiness in what
was good, his disposition was morally right-but "if he had a
disposition to love most those things that were inferior and
less worthy, then his dispositions were vicious." "This notion of Adam's being created without a principle of holiness
in his heart, taken with the rest of Dr. Tayir's scheme, is
inconsistent with" the history in the beginning of Genesis, p.
413. It would, however, be an endless business to quote all
that might be adduced to prove that Edwards did not hold the
opinion which the reviewer imputes to him. There can, it
would seem, be no mistake as to his meaning. These are not
mere casual expressions, which he afterwards retracts or contradicts. Neither is there any room for doubt as to the sense in
which he uses the words disposition, principle, tendency, &c.
* Works, Vol. II. 407, 408.
280