Mr. Jefferson [pp. 642-650]

648 Mr. Je#er8on. [EPTEMBilR,
"widely from those of state rights and indepen"dence now entertained." In a letter to Mr. Monroe in August, in speaking of the importance of a
navy to awe the Barbary States, he observes:' It
' will be said there is no money in the treasury.
There never w ill be money in the treasury till
"the confe der ac y sh ows i ts teeth. The states must
"see th e r od; p erhap s it must b e felt by some one
"of the m. I a m p ersuaded all of w them would re"joice to see every one obliged to furnish its con" tributions. It is not the difficulty of furnishing
" them which beggars the treasury, but the fear
" that others will not fiurnish as much. Every ra"tional c itizen must wis h t o se e an effective in" strument of coercion, and should fear to see it on
"any other element than the wa ter. A nav al f orce
"can ne ver endanger our liberties, nor occas ion
"bl o ods hed; a land force would do both."
We thin t hthat a fai r construc tion of thi s passage,
does not warrant t h e conclusion which the author
h as dra wn from it. It is it t mpossible to imagine
t hat Mr. Jefferson was igno rant of the fact, that
the articles of confederation di d no t c onfer on the
general government any power to coerce the states.
He knew that the c onfe deratio n was, as it professed
to be, a more " firm league of friendship" between
several states-each of which expressly " retained
i t s sovereignty, freedom, and independence;" and
of course, that their stipulations with one another,
could not be enforced by any other right than that
which belongs to all sovereign nations similarly
circumstanced: to wit, the right to consider the
breach of a treaty a good cause of war. His language plainly imports this, and a different construction of it would unjustly impugn his knowledge of
his own government. He believed that " an effective instrument of coercion" was absolutely necessary; and he also believed that all the states would
be rejoiced to see it-a gratification which most
certainly they could easily have procured, if the
articles of confederation had authorized it. As
they did not authorize it, and as he knew that they
did not, his language is to be regarded as a suggestion, that the necessity of the case rendered an enlargement of the powers of government necessary;
or on failure of that, would justify a resort to force
can arise as that which is supposed to have justified-in the opinion of Mr. Jefferson-a resort to
coercion under the old form. He was perfectly
right in thinking that without a public revenue the
government could not long subsist; and there was
no extravagance in the idea, that war itself among
the states, with all its consequences, was not so
much to be deprecated as their certain disruption,
through the loss of their credit and character, and
their utter inability either to keep their faith with
foreign nations, or to protect themselves against
insult and injury from abroad. He entertained
this opinion the more strongly, because he believed
that all the states would "rejoice to see every one
obliged to furnish its contributions; and of course,
he also believed that the coercion necessary to produce this result would not be of long continuance,
and would serve to strengthen, instead of destroying, the league among the states. Under our present constitution, however, ample power is conferred on the federal government, to raise a revenue,
to pr eserve c itto ide the public faith, and to provide for the
common defe nce" of the whole. We cannot, therefore, b e subjected to the alternative which drew
from Mr. Jeffer son th e s trong exp ress ion abo ve
quoted-the alternative of war among ourse lves,
to enforce the pe r form nancef f our a greement s wit h
on e another; or of disunion and anarchy, and nc h,awar
i n a worse form, by the wan t of efficiency in th e
g eneral government.
Mr. Jefferson, however, has furnished his own
interpretation of his meaning too plain to be mista ken. He approved, if he did not suggest, the celebrated resolutions of Virginia, known as Madison's
resolutions; and he wr ote those of Kentucky. In
these, and particularly in the last, t he doctrine of
state sovereignty, and the right of state interposi tion, are avowed in the strongest and most distinct
terms. Those resolutions apply not to the articles
of confederation, but to the actual, existing consti tution; so that there is no sort of necessity to go
back to a casual expression-probably hasty and
not duly weighed-applied by Mr. Jefferson to the
lax and feeble government of the confederation, in
order to discover by inference and analogy what
were his opinions of the very different government
established by the constitution. Indeed the general
course of his administration-particularly through
the whole of his first term-and his declarations
made without reserve and onl numberless occasions — leave no room for doubt upon this subject.
Our author has not done justice to Mr. Jefferson,
nor indeed to himself in the passage above quoted.
It presents the only very striking instance of inaccurate information, or hasty judgment, to be founds
in his whole work; and its inconsistency in these
respects, with the general character of that wvork,
proves only that the best informed, and most care'ful writers, are liable, in the hurry of composition, to be betrayed into unsound conclusions, and
Mr. Jefe r s o n.
[SF,PTEM13F,R,
648
r
in open war.
Even, however, if Mr. Jefferson really believed
that the articles of confederation authorized the
application of " an effective instrument of coercion," by any number of the states acainst any
other number of them-a supposition which cannot
be seriously entertained-it does not follow that
" his notions of the subordination of the states to
the united power of the whole," under our present
constitution, 11 differed widely from those of state
rights and independence, now entertained." The
analogies between the two forms of government,
are not so strict as to justify any such conclusion.
Under the present form, no such pressin,(r necessity