The Battle of Lodi [pp. 541-545]

SOUTHERN LITERARY MESSENGER.
inspired. The defence, which was as obstinate as the
post was important, was persisted in until the French
battalions pouring along in succession, the Austrians
were nearly surrounded. They at last gave way, leavinig their killed and wounded, with one field piece, on
the field; and were pursued so closely into Lodi, that
they could neither shut the gates nor cross the river
before the French van-guard was in possession of the
town.
Beattlieu's main body, upon which the fugitives retreated, consisting of 12.,000 infantry, 4,000 horse, and
30 pieces of artillery, was drawn uLp behind field-works
on the left bank of the Adda, and immediately opposite
to Lodi; the artillery, in front, looking on the bridge,
and the cavalry, a little withdrawn, on the flanks. From
this position, in which he felt at last safe and unassailable, the Austrian general directed a violent cannonade
on the town of Lodi, as soon as he perceived it was
occupied by the French; and expecting rather to dislodge his adversary than to be himself disturbed, he
declined destroying the bridge over the Adda, and thus
interrupting his direct communication with Milan. To
avoid and to mitigate the effect of this cannonade, Bonaparte sheltered his infantry and horse, as fast as they
came up, behind the rampart of the town, which ran
along the bank of the river; and planting advantageously his own artillery, opened a fire, which though
supported by fewer guns, was more effectual than the
enemy's, inasmuch as the Austrians were uncovered.
Notwithstanding the strength of Beaulieu's ground,
Bonaparte perceived, that with men like his, it was not
impregnable; and persevering in his design of intercepting Wukassowich and Colli in their retreat to
Mantua, he resolved, even under the Austrian guns, to
force the passage of the Adda. The attempt was hazardous; but the soul of the enterprise consisted in its
danger, and the main chance of success, in its apparent
impossibility, which, so long as the bridge remained entire, was only apparent. To prevent its destruction,
he proceeded in person, in full exposure to the Austrian
artillery, to place two guns in such positions that their
cross fires, which assisted by Berthier he himself tried,
covered the farther end of the bridge, and rendered all
approach to it impracticable. The freedom with which
he exposed himself while making his skill as an artillery
officer, instrumental to his success as their general, delighted the troops extremely, and was the occasion of
their conferring on him that rank, which rendered him
famous in the annals of the bivouac, as "the Little
Corporal." Then, comparatively at leisure, he made
his preparations for forcing the passage, ordering the
artillery officers to maintain their fire with unabated
spirit, and directing Massena to give the rest of the
troops, who were drawn up behind the rampart, and
had been in constant exertion from 3 o'clock in the
morning, a hasty breakfast and a short repose.
The force which he had in hand at Lodi was more
formidable in character than numbers, consisting of
three brigades of Massena's division, the grenadier
corps lately commanded by Laharpe, and a reserve of
light cavalry under general Beaumont, in all about
13,000 men; Glen. Kilmaine with the principal part of
the horse, and Gen. Mesnard with a brigade of infantry,
had been detached in the morning from Casal; the first
to tile left for the double purpose of keeping free that
wing of the army, and of hanging upon the flank of
the Austrian divisions in their retreat from Milan to
Cassano; the second to the right, for security on that
side, and with instructions to observe and act against
the garrison of Pizzighitone. Serrurier's division being
the last in crossing the Po, and having been directed to
occupy Pavia, was at some distance in the rear; while
Augereau's, which had encamped the previous night at
Borghetto, was following by the way of Casal the progress of the advance. To this General, therefore, as
additional force raight be required at Lodi, orders were
sent to expedite his march, and close up with the front
as soon as possible.
Although the chief reliance for success in this undertaking, was to be on the courage and alacrity of the
troops engaged in it, two circumstances enabled Bonaparte to bring its issue, in some degree, within the
range of calculation. One of these was the information of the inhabitants, that at the present stage of the
water, the Adda was fordable for cavalry, at a point
half a league above the town; and the other, his own
observation, that the Austrian commander, in order to
shelter his troops from theFrench artillery as the French
were sheltered from his own, had withdrawn his mass
of infantry and his corps of horse behind a swell in the
surface of the ground, to a position so much in the rear,
that it placed them farther firom the Austrian guns, than
the French grenadiers would be when prepared to rush
across the bridge. In the first he perceived an opportunity of annoying the right flank of the enemy, and
distracting his attention at a critical moment; in the
second, and more important one, the practicability, by
a sudden and impetuous charge, of reaching his guns
before his infantry could interpose; and in both the
probability that his own column of attack, would be
exposed but for an instant, to the enemy's artillery.
Upon the edge of this sharp inference, which few minds
would have had the acuteness to shape or the firmness
to act upon, the fate of the day was to turn.
At 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when the men were
refreshed, and when Augereau's immediate junction
might be counted on, he directed Gen. Beaumont with
the cavalry and four pieces of light artillery, to pass
the Adda at the ford above, and having gained a footing
on the opposite bank, to cannonade the right flank of
the Austrians, and if practicable, to charge them. A
column of attack 4,000 strong, composed of grenadiers,
and having the second battalion of carabiniers or light
infantry grenadiers, in front,* was formed under the
orders of Massena behind the rampart of the town,
with the leading sections so close to the gate, that by
merely facing to the left, they would be ready to spring
upon the bridge. The rest of Massena's troops had
orders to follow in the charge instantly. The time required for the detour of the cavalry, Bonaparte employed in passing through the ranks of the grenadiers,
by a few energetic expressions encouraging their zeal
and rousing their intrepidity. Shouts of "long live the
republic!" repeated by a thousand voices, welcomed
his appearance, and proclaimed, that troops who had
* When Alexander's officers dissuaded him against attempting
the passage of the Granicus, and particularly at a late hour in
the day, he said —" The Hellespont would blush, if after having
crossed it, I should be afraid of the Granicus." —_Plutarch's Life
of./1lexander.
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