The Right of Instruction [pp. 530-535]

SOUTHERN LITERARY MESSENGER.
formed. Its original draft was excellent, but in its progress and completion it became so insufficient as to give
rise to the present convention. By the vote already
taken, will not the temper of the state legislatures transfuse itself into the senate? Do we create a free government?" We see then that Mr. Madison was of opinion
that the mere power of appointing the senators by the
state legislatures, would give those legislatures so muLch
influence in this branch of the federal legislature as to
impair its necessary power and independence. He
asks: "Do we create a fi-ef government?" What
would he have said had he supposed that to this power
of appointment, there was to be added as flowing from
it, an imperative and constitutional right of instruction,
under the penalty of a forfeiture of the place by disobedience?
At another period of the debate, on the constitution
of the senate, Mr. Madison says: "That great powers
are to be given, there is no doubt; and that these
powers may be abused, is equally true. It is probable
that members may lose their attachments to the states
that sent them; yet the first branch will control them
in many of these abuses. But we are forming a body
on whose wisdom we mean to rely, and their permanency in office secures a proper field in which they may
exert theirfirmness and knowledge. Democratic communities may be unsteady, and be led to action by the
impulse of the moment." After showing the dangers
that may arise from popular bodies without some
wholesome check and control of another body, he
says: "The senate, therefore, ought to be this body;
and to answer these purposes, they ought to have permanency and stability."
On the debate on the question whether the senators
should be paid from the national treasury or by the
states, Mr. Wilson said: "The states may say, although I appoint you for six years, yet if you are
against the state your table shall be unprovided. Is
this the way you are to erect an independent government?" But the doctrine of instructions comes to the
same end by a much shorter and more certain operation. Obey or resign. Men might be found who, to
render a great service to their country, or from personal motives of inclination or ambition, would continue in their seats, although their compensation were
withdrawn. But they have no such choice, when the
action of the legislature comes upon them in the shape
of instructions.
On the same question, Mr. Madison said: "I do
assert that a national senate, elected and paid by the
people, will have no more efficiency than congress; for
the states wrill usurp the general government."
In looking over this column of debates, I have made
my selections as few and brief as possible. Not a syllable is found any where, or f-om any body, which
hints at this right of instruction to senators, as a means
by which the states may control or interfere with the
constitutional action of the federal government, or add
to their own power and influence. Every proceeding
of the convention, every argument and word having
any bearing upon the question, has a contrary tenden cy. The whole doctrine has been got up at a later
date, to serve particular interests and purposes; and,
unfortunately, is so palatable to state pride and state
politicians, that it has found a reception too favorable
for the safety of our government and the preservation
of the Union.
I have not referred to the opinion of Mr. Burke, so
often quoted, because I think the argument stands here
on a different and a stronger ground. We have a number of sovereign states which have, by their own will,
placed themselves uinder one government; and for this
purpose, they have mutually agreed upon the extent and
manner in which each shall have a participation in the
government of the whole. No one has a right to control or interfere with the government of the whole to
any further extent or in any other manner than those
which have been thus agreed upon. They may elect
their senators by their legislatures respectively; having
done this, their power over that body is fulfilled. Tihe
senators of each become the senators of all, and the
power of each over them is merged in the power of the
whole for the period for which they are elected. The
senators from Virginia are as independent of Virginia
as those from Massachusetts. Any control over, or interference with them, except by their periodical election,
would verify the prediction of Mr. Madison, that
"states will usurp the general government," and that
"the greatest danger is from the encroachments of the
states upon the general government."
If you will now do me the favor to republish some
observations I had printed in the "National Gazette,"
on the perusal of Mr. Tyler's letter, by which he resigned his seat in the Senate of the United States, I
shall have the satisfaction to see, in your valuable journal, all I have to say upon a question which, in my
view, is of vital importance to the existence of our national government, and the continuance of this happy
and prosperous Union.
[The following is the article alluded to.]
A man may pertinaciously assert an error in the face
of truth and his own better judgment; but the moment
he attempts to defend it, be assured that he will seldom
fail to destroy the delusion by the very arguments he
brings to support it. Like a brilliant bubble, the moment you would test it by the touch, it is gone. This
truth is forcibly illustrated in the letter addressed by
Mr. Tyler to the Legislature of Virginia, resigning his
seat as a Senator of the United States. Let any one
examine his reasons for refusing to obey the instructions
of his legislature,-for refusing to do what they require
of him, for he does refuse, and his reasons for it are
absolutely unanswerable,-and then say whether the
same reasons do not as decidedly prove that the legislature had no lawful right to give the instructions as that
Mr. Tyler had the right to disobey them. There could
not be a constitutional right to give an order, the obedience to which would be "to violate the Constitution."
This is a plain absurdity, and it is equally clear that if
there was no right to give the order there could be no
duty to obey it. Assuredly the pointed and pregnant
question put by Mr. Tyler applies to the whole subject
of instructions. He asks-" whether the representatives of a sovereign State are such mere automata, as
to move only when they are bidden, and to sit in their
places like statues to record such edicts as may come to
them?" Mr. Tyler implies in his answer, that Senators are not such passive machines, and yet he consents
to become one, in a modified way. On this particular
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