MSS. of Benjamin Franklin [pp. 293-296]

SOUTHERN LITERARY MESSENGER.
that the fourth is most agreeable to it and therefore most
probably true.
In the first place. If you say he has in the beginning
unchangeably decreed all things and left nothing to nature or free agency, these strange conclusions will necessarily follow, 1. That he is now no more a God. It is
true indeed before he made such unchangeable decree,
he was a being of power almighty; but now having
determined every thing he has divested himself of all
further power, he has done and has no more to do, he
has tied up his hands and has now no greater power
than an idol of wood or stone; nor can there be any
more reason for praying to him or worshipping of him
than of such an idol, for the worshippers can never be
better for such worship. Then, 2. He has decreed some
things contrary to the very notion of a wise and good
being; such as that some of his creatures or children
shall do all manner of injury to others, and bring every
kind of evil upon them without cause; that somrie of them
shall even blaspheme him their Creator, in the most horrible manner; and which is still more highly absurd,
that he has decreed, that the greatest part of mankind
shall in all ages put up their earnest prayers to him both
in private and publicly, in great assemblies, when all
the while he had so determined their fate that he could
not possibly grant them any benefits on that account,
nor could such prayers be in any way available. Why
the'i should he ordain them to make such prayers? It
cannot be imagined that they are of any service to him.
Surely it is not more difficult to believe the world was
made by a God of wood or stone, than that the God
who made the world should be such a God as this.
In the second place. If you say he has decreed nothing, but left all things to general nature and the events
of free agency which he never alters or interrupts, then
these conclusions will follow; he must either utterly
hide himself fronm the works of his own hands and take
no notice at all of their proceedings natural or moral,
or he must be, as undoubtedly hlie is, a spectator of every
thing, for there can be no reason or ground to suppose
the first. I say there can be no reason to imagine he
would make so glorious a universe merely to abandon it.
In this case imagine the deity looking on and beholding
the ways of his creatures. Some heroes in virtue lihe
sees are incessantly endeavoring the good of others:
they labor through vast difficulties, they suffer incredible hardships and miseries to accomplish this end, in
hopes to please a good God, and attain his favors which
they earnestly pray for, what answer can he make then
within himself but this? Take the reward chance may
give you, I do ntot intermeddle in these affairs. He sees
others continually doing all manner of evil, and bringing by their actions misery and destruction among mankind, what can he say here but this, if chance rewards
you I shall not punish you, I am not to be concerned. He
sees the just, the innocent, and the beneficent in the hands
of the wicked and violent oppressor, and when the good
are at the brink of destruction they pray to him, Thou
o God art mighty and powerful to save, help us iwe beseech
thee! He answers, I cannot help you, it is none of my busi ness, nor do I at all regard these things. How is it pos sible to believe a wise and an infinitely good being can
be delighted in this circumstance, and be utterly un concerned what becomes of the beings and things he has
created? for thus, we must b.elieve him idle and inac
tive, and that his glorious attributes of power, wisdom,
and goodness are no more to be made use of.
In the third place. If you say he has decreed some
things and left others to the events of nature and free
agency, which hlie never alters or interrupts; still you
un-God him if I may be allowed the expression-he has
nothing to do; he can cause us neither good nor harm;
he is no more to be regarded than a lifeless image, than
Dagon or Baal, or Bell and the Dragon, and as in both
the other suppositions foregoing, that being which from
its power is most able to act, fiom its wisdom knows
best how to act, and fiomin its goodness would always
certainly act best, is in this opinion supposed to become
the most inactive of all beings, and remain everlastingly
idle: an absurdity which when considered or but barely
seen, cannot be swallowed without doing the greatest
violence to common reason and all the faculties of the
undeirstanding.
We arc then necessarily driven to the fourth supposition, that the Deity sometimes interferes by his particular Providence, and sets aside the events which would
otherwise have been produced in the course of nature
or by the free agency of men, and this is perfectly
agreeable with what we can know of his attributes and
perfections. But as some may doubt whether it is possible there should be such a thing as free agency in creatutres, I shall just offer one short argument on that account, and proceed to show how the duty of religion
necessarily follows the belief of a providence. You
acknowledge that God is infinitely powerful, wise and
good, and also a flee agent, and you will not deny that
he has communicated to us part of his wisdom, power
and goodness; that is, he has made us in some degree,
wise, potent and good. And is it then impossible for
him to communicate any part of his freedom, and make
us also in sonme degree free? Is not even his infinite
power sufficivnt for this? I should be glad to hear
what reason any man can give for thinking in that manner. It is sufficient for me to show it is not impossible,
and no man, I think, can show it is improbable. Much
more might be offered to demonstrate clearly, that men
are in some degree free agents and accountable for their
actions; howvever, this I may possibly reserve for
another separate discourse hereafter, if I find occasion.
Lastly. If God does not sometimes interfere by his
providence, it is either because he cannot, or because he
will not. Which of these positions will you choose?
There is a righteous nation grievously oppressed by a
cruel tyrant, they earnestly intreat God to deliver them.
If you say he cannot, you deny his infinite power, which
[you] at first acknowledged. If you say he will not,
you must directly deny his infinite goodness. You are
of necessity obliged to allow that it is highly reasonable to believe a providence, because it is highly absurd
to believe otherwise.
Now, if it is unreasonable to suppose it out of the
power of the Deity to help and favor us particularly, or
that we are out of his hearing and notice, or that good
actions do not procure more of his favor than ill ones;
then I conclude, that believing a providence, we have
the foundation of all true religion, for we should love
and revere that Deity for his goodness, and thank him
for his benefits; we should adore him for his wisdom,
fear him for his power, and pray to him for his favor and
protection. And this religion will be a powerful regu
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