Dissertation on the Characteristic Differences between the Sexes, and on the Position and Influence of Woman in Society, No. III [pp. 672-691]

SOUTHERN LITERARY MAIESSENGER.
and interesting the topic, the patience of a company
will soon be worn out by even an intelligent and fluent
man who will discourse of nothing else. The most insufferable of all bores, says the author of Vivian Grey,
is the man whose mind is engrossed with one single
subject, who thinks of no other, and of course talks of
no other.
So far as the subject matter, or materiel ofconversation
is concerned, let us enter a little into the metaphysics of
the subject, and see, upon philosophical principles, how
woman becomes superior to man in this respect.
The principle of association, or of suggestion as it is
termed by the more recent writers on the philosophy
of the human mind, is the great and controlling law of
the mental frame; it is that principle which enables us
to supply all our wants, to adapt means to ends, to call
up the knowledge of the past, to look into the undeveloped events of the future. It is this associating
faculty which may be looked upon as truly the master
workman of the mind. Its agency is requisite in the
action of all our mental powers, and consequently in
pointing out the intellectual differences between the
sexes, it is proper never to lose sight of so important
a modifier of mental character. Metaphysicians tell us
that there are three principles or laws, according to
which the association of ideas operates. 1st. Resemblance. 2d. Contiguity in time or place. And 3d. Contrast. Now if we examine into these three divisions
we shall find each one susceptible of a subdivision into
two classes, marked and distinct. Thus 1st. There
may be resemblance in the objects themselves. Or 2d.
In the effects or emotions which they excite. For example, I see a man-he is like, in face and feature, to
one I knew well in France-I think immediately of the
Frenchman: here is resemblance in objects themselves.
I see a violent hurricane-it reminds me of the desolating ravages of a Zenghis Khan, or Tamerlane: here
is resemblance in the effects, and not in the objects
themselves. I hear the cooing of the dove, and I think
of the gentleness and innocence of the child. I hear a
man reviling and blaspheming his God, and I think of
midnight darkness: here is similarity in the emotions
excited by the objects. A corresponding division may
be made of contrast. Thus I see a dwarf, and he calls
instantly to my mind the largest man I ever saw: this
is contrast in the objects. I see a raging, destructive
lion, and think immediately of the meek and humble
Saviour of the world: here is contrast in the effects. I
see the white and tender lily on the drooping stalk, and
I think of the fiendish passions of a Macbeth or a
Richard: here is contrast in the emotions excited by
the objects. Lastly, contiguity in time and place may
be divided into casual and fixed; thus I see a man today whom I saw yesterday in company with another:
I instantly think of that other. I hear the last eclipse
mentioned, I think of the place I was in at that time
the company I was with, the anecdotes told, &c. In the
first instance we have casual contiguity in place, and in
the second in place a~nd time both. I see the moon on
the meridian, and think of the tides in our rivers. I
see a magnet, and I think of its attraction for iron; here
is necessary contiguity in time, and in the last instance
in place too. Upon this last species of contiguity is
dependent that most important of all relations, the relatioc of cause and effect, and of premises and conclusions.;
In unison with the division here made of the associating principles, it is easy to explain the character of
three distinct orders of mind, which will of course appear widely different in the conversational displays of
the social circle. There is, first, the common mind,
associating its ideas together by palpable resemblance
or contrast among them, and by the mere casual and
loose contiguity in time and place. Secondly, the poetical or sentimental mind, associating principally by resemblance or contrast in the effects produced by objects
or the emotions which they excite. And thirdly, the
philosophical mind, associating principally by necessary
contiguity in time and place, by cause and effect, premises and conclusions.
Such a mind as the first, is most impressed with the
details and occurrences around. It never ascends to the
original contemplation of ideas and thoughts which
belong to the region of philosophy and poetry. It may,
it is true, recollect sometimes, distant and beautiful
analogies, or even philosophical associations, but it is
purely because it has heard these things spoken of by
others, and not from original conception. Such a mind
has no creative power of its own; as it receives so does
it pour forth, without alteration. It has been well compared to the cistern into which water is poured; you
have nothing to do but turn the cock and out it comes
(as one of our newspaper editors recently observed, in
relation to a different subject,) "water, dirt, sticks,
bugs, pine tags and all!" Such a mind has no productive powcer whatever. In this flood of details, you
see no connecting principle like cause and effect, premises and conclusions, &c.-but this thing is remembered because it is like that. This fact is now related
because it was spoken at the same time with that, or
in the same place. Such an individual as this has, as
Diderot expresses it, "une tate meubl6ec d'un grand
nombre de choses disparates," which he says resembles
a library with mismatched books, or a German compilation garnished, without reason and without taste,
with Hebrew, Arabic, Greek, and Latin.
Such individuals as these are more pleasing and
amusing to us in conversation, when the mind is not
otherwise engaged, than most of us are willing to allow.
They spread before us a promiscuous feast of neighborhood news, and like Mathews the comedian, although
there be but one speaker, they give you the sayings, the
conjectutres, the shrugs, and the wintks of all the parties
concerned, and thus give to their communications quite
a dramatic effect. Barbers, midwives, seamstresses,
hostesses, &c. cultivate this kind of association to the
greatest pitch of perfection. Their professions may be
said to demand it.
Such individuals, when called into court to give testimony, are sometimes exceedingly amnusing, from the
pertinacity with which they detail all, even the most
minute circumstances, and when interrupted because
of the irrelevancy or illegality of their testimony, they
are very apt to begin again at the very beginning of
their narrative. In the minuteness of their remembrances they are like Mrs. Qtuickly in the play, when
she wishes to make Falstaff remember the time when
he promised to marry her.* The Cicerone of Italy
have generally memories of the same description.
* This ha s gener ally bee n adduced by t he metaphysicians
since the time of Lord Kames, as an exemplification of this
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