The works of Francis Bacon, lord chancellor of England.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORK. 339 The logicians appear scarcely to have thought of induction capable of explaining and separating seriously of induction, passing it over with some experiments, and coming to a certain conclusion slight notice, and hurrying on to the formulae of by a proper series of rejections and exclusions. dispute. But we reject the syllogistic demonstra- If, however, the common judgment of the logition, as being too confused, and letting nature cians has been so laborious, and has exercised escape from our hands. For, although nobody such great wits, how much more must we labour can doubt that those things which agree with the in this which is drawn not only from the recesses middle term agree with each other, (which is a of the mind, but the very entrails of nature. sort of mathematical certainty,) nevertheless, there Nor is this all, for we let down to a greater is this source of error, namely, that a syllogism depth, and render more solid the very foundations consists of propositions, propositions of words, of the sciences, and we take up the beginning of and words are but the tokens and signs of things. our investigation from a higher part than men If, therefore, the notions of the mind (which are have yet done, by subjecting those matters to as it were the soul of words, and the basis of this examination which common logic receives upon whole structure and fabric) are badly and hastily the credit of others. For the logicians borrow abstracted from things, and vague, or not suffi- the principles of one science from another, in the ciently defined and limited, or, in short, faulty next place they worship the first formed notions (as they may be) in many other respects, the of their minds, and,lastly, they rest contented with whole falls to the ground. We reject, therefore, the immediate information of the senses, if well the syllogism, and that not only as regards first directed. But we have resolved that true logic principles, (to which even the logicians do not ought to enter upon the several provinces of the apply them,) but also in intermediate propositions, sciences with a greater command than is poswhich the syllogism certainly manages in some sessed by their first principles, and to force those way or other to bring out and produce, but then supposed principles to an account of the grounds they are barren of effects, unfit for practice, and upon which they are clearly determined. As far clearly unsuited to the active branch of the as relates to the first notions of the understanding, sciences. Although we would leave therefore to not any of the materials which the understanding, the syllogism, and such celebrated and applauded when left to itself, has collected, is unsuspected demonstrations, their jurisdiction over popular by us, nor will we confirm them unless they themand speculative arts, (for here we make no altera- selves be put upon their trial and be judged tion,) yet, in every thing relating to the nature of accordingly. Again, we have many ways of siftthings, we make use of induction, both for our ing the information of the senses themselves: for major and minor propositions. For we consider the senses assuredly deceive, though at the same induction to be that form of demonstration which time they disclose their errors: the errors, howassists the senses, closes in upon nature, and ever, are close at hand, whilst their indication presses on, and, as it were, mixes itself with must be sought at a greater distance. action. There are two faults of the senses: they either Hence also the order of demonstration is natu- desert or deceive us. For in the first place there rally reversed. For at present the matter is so are many things which escape the senses,however managed, that from the senses and particular well directed and unimpeded, owing either to the objects they immediately fly to the greatest gene- subtilty of the whole body, or the minuteness of ralities, as the axes round which their disputes its parts, or the distance of place, or the slowness may revolve: all the rest is deduced from them or velocity of motion, or the familiarity of the intermediately, by a short way we allow, but an object, or to other causes. Nor are the apprehenabrupt one, and impassable to nature, though easy sions of the senses very firm, when they grasp the and well suited to dispute. But, by our method, subject; for the testimony and information of the axioms are raised up in gradual succession, so that senses bears always a relation to man and not to we only at last arrive at generalities. And that the universe, and it is altogether a great mistake which is most generalized, is not merely national to assert that our senses are the measure of hut well defined, and really acknowledged by things. nature as well known to her, and cleaving to the To encounter these difficulties, we have everyvery pith of things. where sought and collected helps for the senses By far our greatest work; however, lies in the with laborious and faithful service, in order to form of induction and the judgment arising from supply defects and correct errors: and that not so it. For the form of which thle logicians speak, much by means of instruments, as by experiwhich proceeds by bare enum!iationr, is puerile, ments. For experiments are much more delicate and its conclusions precarib. is exposed to than the senses themselves, even when aided by danger from one contrary exarihe, only consi- instruments, at least if they are skilfully and ders what is habitual, and leads not to any final scientifically imagined and applied to the required result. point.. We attribute but little, therefore, to the The sciences, on the contrary, require a form immediate and proper perception of the senses,

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Title
The works of Francis Bacon, lord chancellor of England.
Author
Bacon, Francis, 1561-1626.
Canvas
Page 339
Publication
Philadelphia,: A. Hart,
1852.
Subject terms
Bacon, Francis, -- 1561-1626.

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"The works of Francis Bacon, lord chancellor of England." In the digital collection Making of America Books. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/aje6090.0003.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 21, 2025.
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