The works of Francis Bacon, lord chancellor of England.

'216 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. BooK II.
shall be thy speaker, and thou shalt be to him as that she cannot be showed to the sense by corpoGod:) yet with the people it is the more mighty; ral shape, the next degree is to show her to the
for so Solomon saith, "c Sapiens corde appellabitur imagination in lively representation: for to show
prudens, sed dulcis eloquio majora. reperiet;" her to reason only in subtilty of argument, was
signifying, that profoundness of wisdom will help a thing ever derided in Chrysippus and many of
a man to a name or admiration, but that it is elo- the Stoics; who thought to thrust virtue upon
quence that prevaileth in an active life. And as men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which
to the labouring of it, the emulation of Aristotle have no sympathy with the will of man.
with the rhetoricians of his time, and the expe- Again, if the affections in themselves were plirience of Cicero, hath made them in their works ant and obedient to reason, it were true, there
of rhetoric exceed themselves. Again, the ex- should be no great use of persuasions and insinuacellency of examples of eloquence in the orations tions to the will, more than of naked proposition
of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfec- and proofs; but in regard to the continual mutition of the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled nies and seditions of the affections,
the progression in this art; and therefore the de- s" Video meliora, proboque;
ficiencies which I shall note will rather be in some Deteriora sequor:"
collections, which may as handmaids attend the reason would become captive and servile, if eloart, than in the rules or use of the art itself. quence of persuasions did not practise and win
Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the imagination from the affections part, and conthe roots of this science, as we have done of the tract a confederacy between the reason and imarest; the duty and office of Rhetoric is, to apply gination against the affections; for the affections
reason to imagination for the better moving of the themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as reawill. For we see reason is disturbed in the ad- son doth. The difference is, that the affection
ministration thereof by three means; by illaquea- beholdeth merely the present; reason beholdeth
tion or sophism, which pertains to logic; by ima- the future and sum of time. And therefore the
gination or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; present filling the imagination more, reason is
and by passion or affection, which pertains to commonly vanquished; but after that force of
morality. And as- in negotiation with others, men eloquence and persuasion hath made things future
are wrought by cunning, by importunity, and by and remote appear as present, then upon the revehemency; so in this negotiation within our- volt of the imagination reason prevaileth.
selves, men are undermined by consequences, We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be
solicited and importuned by impressions or obser- no more charged with the colouring of the worst
vations, and transported by passions. Neither is part, than logic with sophistry, or morality with
the nature of man so unfortunately built, as that vice. For we know the doctrines of contraries are
those powers and arts should have force to disturb the same, though the use be opposite. It appeareth
reason, and not to establish and advance it: for also that logic differeth from rhetoric, not only as
the end of logic is, to teach a form of argument the fist from the palm, the one close the other at
to secure reason, and not to entrap it; the end of large; but much more in thlis, that logic handleth
morality is to procure the affections to obey rea- reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it
son, and not to invade it; the end of rhetoric is, as it is planted in popular opinions and manners.
to fill the imagination to second reason, and not And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric
to oppress it: for these abuses of arts come in but as between logic on the one side, and moral or
"' ex obliquo," for caution. civil knowledge on the other, as participating of
And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, both: for the proofs and demonstrations of logic
though springing out of a just hatred of the rhe- are toward all men indifferent and the same; but
toricians of his time, to esteem of rhetoric but as the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought to
a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that differ according to the auditors:
did mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome " Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion:"
by variety of sauces to the pleasure of the taste. which application, in perfection of idea, ought to
For we see that speech is much more conversant extend so far, that if a man should speak of the
in adorning that which is good, than in colouring same thing to several persons, he should speak to
that which is evil; for there is no man but them all respectively in several ways: though
speaketh more honestly than he can do or think; this politic part of eloquence in private speech it
and it was excellently noted by Thucydides in is easy for the greatest orators to want; whilst,
Cleon, that because he used to hold on the bad by the observing their well-graced forms of speech,
side in causes of estate, therefore he was ever they lose the volubility of application: and thereinveigh:ing against eloquence and good speech; fore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to
knowing that no man can speak fair of courses better inquiry, not being curious whether we place
sordid and base. And therefore as Plato said it here, or in that part which concerneth policy.
eirgantly, "That Virtue, if she could be seen, Now, therefore, x, ill I descend to the deficiencies,
w —ould move great love and affection;" so seeing which, as I said, are but attendances: and first, I