The life of Napoleon Buonaparte, emperor of the French. By Sir Walter Scott.

APPEND IX. 89)|
place, he could have posted himself with his wvhole published by O'Meara, is perhaps the original from
army upon the communications of his enemy with which tile greatest part of the other preoductions are
Moscow; and his enemy could scarcely have at- derived. It is now generally acknowledged to
tempted to pass across his front, to seek the road by have been, to a certain extent, composed by Vaona.
Kalounga. Barclay de Tolly must have gone to the parte.
northward, evacuating or leaving Smolensk to its These works have had one particular object,-the
fate, and Napoleon might have continued his march defence of an unfortunate and a great man. The in.
upon Moscow, keeping his position constantly be- dividual, however, is always held up to view; the
tween his enemy and his comrmunications with that actions are softened or strengthened to suit this purcity, and with the southern provinces. The fate of pose, andin the extension of this design, the reputaSmnolensk could not have been doubtfill. tion of his own officers, and a strict adherence to
" Here, then, a different mode, even upon the facts, are occasionally sacrificed. The military feasame plan of manoeuvring, would have produced two tures of the campaign have remained unanswered;
of the three objects which Napoleon is supposed to whilst the wounded honour and fame of his generals
have had in view by these movements. But these have called for some counter-statements, whichl
were not the only movements in his power, at that throw curious light on the whole campaign, andl on
time. The viceroy is stated to have been at Souraj the nlaohinery of a system which so long alarmed the
and Velij. If, instead of moving by his right, Na- i orld. These last are little known in Britain.
poleon had moved by his left, and brought the first, Whoever has perused the mass of military works
fifth, and eighth corps from the Dnieper to form the by French officers, most of them ably written, and
reserve; and had marched from Souraj upon any mlany artfully composed, must feel how much they
point of the Upper Dnieper, he would equally have tend to encourage a peculiar feeling of national suput himself in the rear of his enemy, and in a position periority in young minds, in a country where only
to act upon his communications. He would have their own military works are read. In these works
effected this object with greater certainty, if he had they never find a French army beaten in the. field,
ventured to move the first, and the filth and eighth without some plausible reason; or, as Las Cases
corps through the country on the left of the Dnieper. terms it,* " a concurrence of unheard-of fatalities,"
And in this last movement there would have been to account for it. Upon the minds of young soldiers,
no great risk, first, because Napoleon's manceuvres this has an effect of the most powerful description.
upon the Dwina would have attracted all the enemy's Great care appears to have been taken in these
attention; secondly, because these corps would all various works, to meet the accusations of military
have passed Smcilensk, before the Russian generals men respecting the disposition and employment of
could have known of their movement, in like manner the French army. Where a fault is admitted, the
as Napoleon passed the Dnieper and arrived at error is at least transferred from Bonaparte to the
Smolensk without their knowledge. By either of J incapacity or remissness of his generals. The talents
these modes of proceeding, Napoleon would have and honour of the British commanders are rated at
cut off his enemy from their communications, would a low state; their success attributed more to chsmce
have obliged them to fight a battle to regain these than to military skill, and the important result c the
comnunnications, and in all probability Smolensk battle, less to the courage of the British troops, than
would have fallen into his hands wiithout loss, with to the opportune arrival of the Prussians, whom they
its buildings entire-an object of the lastconsequence allege to have saved the British army fiom destrlcin the event of the campaign. I tion. What are now termed liberal ideas, seem to
"Either of these last niodes of effecting the object have made it a fashion to assert, and give credence
would have been shorter by two marches than the, to these accounts; and itis no uncormmon occurrence
movement of the whole army upon Rasassina." to meet with Englishmen who doubt the glory and
J success of their countrymen on that eventful day.
i A wounded spirit of faction has contributed to this
No. 8. i feeling, and in the indulgence of its own gratification,
and under the mask of patriotism, endeavoured to' 1815; 1throw a doubt over the military achievements of our
By Capt. John W. Pringlo, of the Royal Engineers. countrymen, eagerly laid hold of any faults or failures,
Page 722. gaud, War of 1815: London, 1824.-Many passages in these
works will be found quite parallel; for instance, Morntho
THE following observations were hastily made, at Ion, vol. ii, p. 272-280, with liv. ix, p. 43. Grouchy, page 4,
a time when much public interest was excited by the designates these works from St lIelena, as containing,
various accounts of the campaign of 1815, edited "des instrnctionls et des ordres supposes; des moesveomens
by several individuals, all claiming the peculiar dis- imaginaires," etc.; also, "des assertions erronnles, des
tinction of having been dictated by Napoleon, or writ- hypothisesfaites apres coop;" see also p. 26. P. 22, he says,
ten under his immediate direction. With some slight with justice, of these authors: " Des indivirds qui se perexceptions, and occasional anecdotes, they nearly scadent que 1'an1role de glisre d'un grand lhomone, en les
correspond, as far as relates to the military de- iclairanmt un moment, les a tratsformes en d'irricesatdes
tails.+ The 9th volume of the Memoirs of Napoleon, antoritis, et ne voyant pas q2u2n iclett d'emnprznt qui ve se
re.fl cchit sur aocnmn fait d'armes con-nus, suer anznias ser-' Liv. ix, 3Iimoires Historiques de Napoleon: Sir R. vices emninens, ne sert qu'ai mie2xfaire ressortir la sprgPhiiips, London, 18t20.-lMontholon, Memoires de Napolion: sonmptueuse intlperitie desjugemens qu'ils prononcent.n
(olbunr, London, 18M2.-Las Cases: London, 2 vols.-Gour- + Vol. II, p. 15.