[Pamphlets. American history]

11
Gridley, by General Putnam, and possibly by another General,
(I.) and here for a time the officer to whom the command had
been entrusted debated with several others as to the execution of
written orders from his and their superior.
When an officer is directed to fortify a hill, it means that his
fortification is to include the summit of that hill. Prescott knew
this, for under the orders he marched to the proper point, and
apparently but for officious interference would have built his
redoubt on Bunker's Hill. If he had originally intended to go on
to Breed's Hill, he would not have detached Nutting at the Neck,
nor would he have marched over the summit; but would for nearly
a mile have followed the easier route which Nutting did follow,
and would have diverged from it at a point nearer to his destination. Whether it was by error in judgment, or by intentional
deviation, that the site of fortification was fixed at a lower level
and nearer to Boston than the orders prescribed, the result was to
change the whole character of the expedition. It was no longer
a mere advance of the line of the intrenchments, or the fortification of a picket-post upon the existing line, but the construction
of a detached work midway between the two armies, difficult of
support or defence, and such a menace to the British army in
Boston as to make the immediate capture of the works on their
part a duty and a necessity. (2.)
It is impossible carefully to read the story of this r7th day of
June, as told by documents and witnesses of the time, without reaching the conviction that a serious engagement was neither intended
nor expected, as the result of the intrenching expedition. General
Ward, the chief military officer, and General Warren, the Presi1. Gray's letter. It would be difficult to name any general except Putnam
who would be likely to be there. it certainly was not Ward. Thonmas, Heath
an(d Spencer, were at Roxbury. Warren passed the night at Watertown.
Folsom was absent. Pomeroy was no meddler.
2. Lieutenant Clarke's pamphlet (quoted in a note, p. 168, Siege of Boston,)
states that it was in consequence of the firing of cannon from the fort that Gage
determined to attack the redoubt. Peter Brown (1775), reflecting perhaps a
general opinion among the men, says, "The danger we were in when discovered
about 5 in the morning, made us think there wavs treachery, and that we were
brought there to be slain."