Dictionary of Greek and Roman antiquities. Ed. by William Smith. Illustrated by numerous engravings on wood.

UNIVERSITAS. JNIVEl SITAS. 1215
as a thing in itself, that is, the whole is viewed material things which form the ideal unit of his
pro diviso; for division in this case is the same as property.
making many wholes out of one whole. It is In this way we arrive at the correct notion of a
here assumed that the thing is in its nature di- universitas of persons, which is the notion of a
visible; as a piece of land which is capable of fictitious person imagined for certain purposes, as
being divided into parts. the notion of a universitas of independent material
But there are parts of things corporeal which things is the notion of a fictitious thing, imagined
are essential to the constitution of the whole, so that for certain purposes.
the whole cannot be divided into parts without A single person only canl properly be viewed as
the destruction of its nature; as a living animal the subject of rights and duties; but the notion of:
for instance. legal capacity may by a fiction be extended to an
Besides the corporeal parts into which a (cor- imaginary person, to a universitas personarum, but
poreal) thing is divisible, we may suppose incorpo- the fictitious person is not a unit composed of the
real, ideal parts of a corporeal thing (Dig. 45. tit. real persons: it is a name in which the several
3. s. 5). These parts are assumed fractions of a: persons or a majority may act for certain permanent
whole, not corporeal parts. If such a part is the purposes. The purpose itself is sometimes the
object of thought, the whole corporeal thing is fictitious person, as when property is given for
viewed pro indiviso: the corporeal object of the will the service of religion, whether it is administered
is the thing, and the limitation of the will to a by one person or several persons. Such juristical
part, is merely intellectual. Thus several persons persons have certain legal capacities as individuals
may be joint owners of a piece of undivided land, have; but their legal capacities are limited to
but no one canll say that any particular part belongs property as their object. It is true that the Roto him. The, case just put is that of a corporeal mans often considered persons as a collective unity,
whole and ideal parts. But the whole may simply because they all exercised the same
be ideal and the parts corporeal: as when there functions: thus they speak of the Collegiunm'
is a number of independent corporeal things, not of the consuls [COLLIEGIUI], and of the Tribuni
materially connected, but they are intellectually Plebis. In like manner they say that the Duumconnected so as to form in idea a whole: thus a viri of a mnunicipum are to be viewed as one person.
flock of sheep is an ideal whole, and the several (Dig. 50. tit. 1. s. 25). But these fictitious
sheep are the independent corporeal things. The unities have only reference to Jus Publicumn, and
ideal whole is not composed of the several corporeal they have no necessary connection with juristical
things, for an ideal whole cannot be composed of persons, the essential character of which is the
corporeal parts; but the ideal whole is a notion capacity to have and acquire property by some
which is formed witlh reference to some particular nasme.
purpose. It is necessary that the purpose of the Juristical persons could be subjects of ownerseveral things shall not be different from and inde- ship, Jura in re, obligationes, and hereditas:
pendent of the general purpose for which the notion they could own slaves and have the Patronatus;
is formed, but subservient to it. Thus as separate but all the relations of Familia, as the Patria Pocorporeal things may be often materially united to testas and others of a like kind, were foreign to the
form a new corpus; so the several independent notion. But though the capacity to have property
things which are not capable of such material is the distinguishing characteristic of Juristical
union, may be viewed as an ideal union or as a persons viewed with relation to Jus Privatum, the
a universitas for some purpose; the flock of sheep objects for which the property is had and applied
Ynay be viewed as a whole, as a universitas, for may be any; and the capacity to have property
the purpose of ownership. Such a unIv-ersitas, as implies a purpose for which it is had, which is
already observed, is independent of the several cor- often much more important than this umere capacity.
poreal things: it still exists if they are all changed. But the purposes for which Juristical persons lhave
Thus in a flock of sheep woe have a fictitious, a property are quite distinct from their capacity to
juristical whole or thing, and in the notion of have it. This will appear from all or any of the
a universitas of persons we have a fictitious or ju- examples hereinafter given.
ristical person, which is still the samie person The following are Juristical persons: (1) Civi..
though all the individuals are changed. As' a tas: (0) Municipes: this term is more conmmon
number of sheep must have a nalne, a flock, in order than iMunicipium, and comprehends both citizens
to be comprehended in one notion, so a juristical of a {Municipium and a Colony; it is also used
person must have a name, ns the universitas of when the object is to express- the Municipium as
Fabri, or the city of Rome. a whole opposed to the'individual members of it.
The term universitas then imay have Various (3) Respublica. In the republican period, when
senses, 1. Both the universitas and the parts may used without an adjunct, Respublica expressed
be corporeal (Dig. 50. tit. 16. s. 239. ~ 8): tern- Rome, but in the old jurists it signifies a Civitas
torium est universitas agrorum intra fines cujus- dependent on Rome. (4) Respublica Civitatis or
que civitatis. 2. The universitas may be corpo- Municipii: (5) Commune, Commlunitas. Besides
real, and the parts incorporeal, as when. we imagine the Civitates, component parts of the Civitates are
fractional parts of a thing. 3.' The universitas may also Juristical persons: (1) Curiae or Decuriones
be incorporeal, and the parts corporeal, as a flock the word Decuriones often denotes the individuals
of sheep. 4. The universitas and the parts may composing the body of Decuriones as opposed to
both be incorporeal. the Civitas (Municipes), which appears from a
The fourth is the case when the notion of a passage in the Digest (4. tit. 3. s. 15), where it is
whole and its parts is not applied to things, but to stated that an action for Dolus will not lie against
rights: thus a man's whole property may' be the. Municipes, for a fictitious person cannot be
viewed as a unit, or as a Ulniversitas, which compre- guilty of Dolus, but such action will lie againlst the
hends.the several rights that he has to the several individual Decariones wsho administer the affaiLr