A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology. By various writers. Ed. by William Smith. Illustrated by numerous engravings on wood.

1316 ZENON. ZENON.
de Fin. iii. 6. 8; comp. Diog. Laert. vii. 100, &c.), (Stob. p. 158; Cic. de Fin.. c.) It is not without
with the attainment of which, consequently, hap- reason that the germ of the distinction between
piness must be coincident (Stob. 1. c. p. 138). This legality and morality has been traced in this Stoic
he described as perfect unanimity of life (dopoAoyov- separation of the KaOiKov and Ka-dpBdclia. Hence,
pLEvws Cv, Stob. 1. c. p. 132, 134; Cic. de Fin. 1. c.), just as morality, or virtue, can only subsist in con..
which in its turn should manifest itself as the un- junction with the perfect dominion of reason, so
hindered flow of life (epboLa ToD f3iov, Stob. 1. c. vice can consist only in the renunciation of the
p. 138; Diog. Laert. vii. 88; Sext. Emp. Hypot. iii. authority of right reason, and virtue is absolutely
172). Unanimity of life however can only be at- - without any accommodation -opposed to vice
tained (so Zenon already appears to have added in (Cic. Tuse. iv. 13, Acad. i. ] 0, de Fin. iii. 21. iv.
discussing the point, see Diog. Labrt. vii. 87, &c.), 9, Parad. iii. I; Diog. Lart. vii. 127; Stob. p. 104,
in proportion as it in its turn is in complete har- 116); nay, virtue and vice cannot subsist side by
mony with the rest of nature. The further deve- side in one and the same subject, can admit of no
lopment and more exact definition of this subject increase and decrease (Cic. de Fin. iii. 14, &c.),
however belongs to Cleanthes,Chrvsippus, and other and no one moral action can be more virtuous than
successors of Zenon (Diog. Laert. vii. 89, &c.). another (Cic. de Fin. iii. 14; Sext. Emp. adv. MLath.
Perfect unanimity of life however can only be vii. 422). All actions however are to be reckoned
achieved through the unrestricted dominion of in, that is, all are either good or bad, since even
right reason, that is, by our reason not only ruling impulses and desires rest upon free consent (Stob.
snconditionally over our other energies andcircum- p. 162, 164; Cic. Tusc. iv. 9, Acad. i. 10), and
stances, but also coinciding with the universal consequently even passive conditions or affections,
reason —the reason which governs nature. This which, because withdrawn from the dominion of
last is, in other words, the source of moral law, of reason, are immoral (Diog. Lairt. vii. 110; Stob.
that which forbids as well as that which commands p. 166; Cic. Tusc. iv. 6. 14), nay, more, they are
(Stob. 1. c. p. 104; comp. Plut. Stoic. Rep. p. 1037). the source of immoral actions (Stob. p. 170, &c.;
Since then that unvarying unanimity or con- Cic. de Fin. iv. 38; Plut. de Virt. mor. p. 393).
sistency of soul, out of which morally good volitions Zenon, therefore, had already especially concerned
and actions spring, is virtue (Stob. 1. c. p. 104; himself with the more exact definition of the affecCic. Tusc. iv. 15), true good can only consist in tions, and had composed a separate treatise on
virtue (Stob. p. 90; Diog. Labrt. vii. 102, 127), them, as has been above remarked. To him belongs
and this being self-sufficient, can need no external the fourfold division of them. He referred them to
good circumstances (Diog. Lairt. vii. 104; Cic. de present (7rpomcparov), and therefore operative errors
Fin. iii. 10; Sen. Epist. 9; Plut. 1. c.). That, to (false assumptions) respecting the good and the
the accomplishment or attainment of which virtue bad (Cic. Tusc. iii. 3; Stob. p. 170). They must
is directed, has no value in itself, but on the con- be rooted out, and not merely set aside (Cic. Tusc.
trary derives value only from its being willed and iv. 18, &c.), and their place must be occupied by
accomplished morally (Stob. 1. c. p. 94). And it corresponding movements of the reason. As hie
was just at this point that Zenon felt himself con- was the originator of the fourfold division of the
strained to deviate from the Cynics. He could not affections (desire and fear, pleasure and pain: E7rLadmit that things indifferent in themselves are Ovuia, po'os,'1o0e,, AXvr7; Cic. Tusc. iv. 6; Stob.
without any value for us. On the contrary, he p. 166, &c.; Diog. Lairt. vii. 110), so in all proendeavoured to point out differences which fixed bability he also distinguished the three emotions
the measure of their relative value. They have which are according to reason (BoSAX1ffs, Xapa,
this, according to him, in proportion as they EvXaaGea,) and assumed that pain, because it is
correspond to the original natural instinct of self- merely passive, cannot be transformed into a corpreservation (Diog. Labrt. vii. 85; Cic. de Fin. iii. responding rational emotion. In like manner to
5, 15, iv. 10, v. 9, Acad. i. 16). What corresponds him probably, in what is essential, belong the
to that is justly preferred (is a 7rponypLov), has a definitions of the four virtues, as well as the
certain worth (&tia, Stob. 1. c. p. 144, &c. 156; assertions, subsequently repeated to satiety, recomp. Diog. Lairt. vii. 105), and admits of being specting the perfections of the wise man. How far
shown to be such, that is, of having a foundation he carried these out, and whether, or how far he
for it established (Cic. Acad. i. 10, &c.; Stob. 1. c. conducted the further sub-division of the four
p. 158; Diog. La/rt. vii. 108). But because virtues, we are not able to determine.
every thing which conduces to self-preservation, Polemon is said already to have given utterance
like self-preservation itself, has only a conditional to the suspicion that Zenon intended to purloin
(relative) value, it cannot be a constituent element other people's doctrines in order to appropriate
of happiness; the latter depends merely upon moral them to himself in a new dress (Diog. Laert. vii.
volition and action (Cic. de Fin. iii. 13). That 25). At a later time he was frequently charged
which is to be preferred is an appropriate thing with having been the inventor not so much of new
(caOiKov), a designation which Zenon first intro- things, as of new words (Cic. de Fin. iii. 2, iv. 2,
duced (Diog. Laert. I. c.), and shows itself to be &c., Tusc. v. 12), and already Chrysippus had
such by its rational foundation (e6VoAyov, Diog., endeavoured to defend him against such charges
La'rt. and Stob. 11. cc.). The appropriate, however, (Diog. Laert. vii. 122). But though those charges
and its foundation, are perfect only when the latter may in part have been unjust, yet even the acuteis unconditional, that is, corresponds to unconditional ness of Chrysippus and others was not able to
requirements (a Kac'-pnopea, Stob. p. 1.58; Cic. de develop out of the doctrines of Zenon an organiFin. iii. 7, 9, 14, 17, de Off. i. 3). So long as an cally constructed system, growing out of one
action can merely be justified as fit, it is a middling fundamental idea, such as we find in Plato and
(pdleor) action, and has no real moral value, even Aristotle. Logic and physic always continued
though it should perfectly coincide with a truly mere supplements of ethic, connected with it rather
moral action in reference to its object or purport. externally than internally; and the system of the