A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology. By various writers. Ed. by William Smith. Illustrated by numerous engravings on wood.

32 EPICTETUS.,EPICTETUTS.
Prooemn.) The manual (Enchiridion)'and comr- our opinion upon it, are in our power (i. 12. 37)'"
mentaries of Arrian, together with the explanations in our choice we are free (i. 12. 9, 17. 28, 19. 9);
of Simplicius to the former, and some later para- nothing that is external of us, not even Zeus, call
phrases, have been edited by Schweighaiiser, who overcome our choice: it alone can control itself.
has added the notes of Upton, his own, and those (i. 29. 12, ii. 1. 22, iv. 1, ii. 2. 3, iii. 3. 10, i. 1.
of some other commentators. (Epicteteae Philoso- 23, iv. 1. 69.) Our choice, however, is determined
phiae Monumenta, post J. Uptoni aliorumque curas, by our reason, which of all our faculties. sees and
edidit et illustravit J. Schweglhsaiiser, Lipsiae, 1799, tests itself and everything else. (i. 1. 4, i. 20.)
1800, 6 vols. 8vo.) Reason is our-guide (l'7n/IoviKdv), and capable
We may apply to Epictetus himself what he of conquering all powers which are not subject to
says of his Stoic master, viz. that he spoke so im- freedom (ii. 1. 39; comp. iii. 3); it is the governpressively, and so plainly described the wickedness ing power given to man (rb ivpp eov, i. 1. 7, 17.
of the individual, that every one felt struck, as 21); hence only that which is irrational cannot be
though he himself had been spoken to personally. endured by it. (i. 2.) It is by his reason alone that
(Dissert. iii. 23, 29, comp. c. 15, i. 9.) Being man is distinguished from the brute (ii. 9. 2, iii.
deeply impressed with his vocation as a teacher, 1. 25): he who renounces his reason and allows
he aimed in his discourses at nothing else but himself to be guided by external things, is like a
winning the minds of his hearers to that which was man who has forgotten his own face (i. 2. 14);
good, and no one was able to resist the impression and he who desires or repudiates that which is
which they produced. (Arrian, Ep. ad L. Gell. i. beyond his-power, is not free. (i. 4. 19.)
p. 4.) Far from any contempt of knowledge, That which is in accordance with reason coinhe knows how to value the theory of forming cides with that which is in accordance with nature
conclusions and the like. (Dissert. i. 7, 1, &c., and pleasing to God. (i. 12. 9, 26. 2, iii. 20. 13,
comp. i. 8, 1, &c., i. 17, ii. 23,' 25.) He only ii. 10. 4, i. 12. 8.) Our resemblance to God (i.
desired that logical exercises, the study of books 12. 27), or our relationship to the Deity (i. 9. 1,
and of eloquence, should not lead persons away 11), and the coincidence of our own will with the
from that of which they were merely the means, will of God (ii. 17. 22, comp. 19. 26, iii. 24. 95,
-and that they should not minister to pride, haugh- iv. 1, 89. 103, 4. 39), consist in our acting in actiness, and avarice. (i. 8. 6, &c., 29. 55, ii. 4. 11, cordance with reason and in freedom. Through
9. 17, 16. 34, 17. 34, 21. 20, iii. 2. 23, 17. 28, reason our souls are as closely connected and mixed
24. 78.) He never devotes any time to disquisi- up with the Deity, as though they were parts of
tions which do not, either directly or indirectly, him (i. 14. 6, ii. 8. 11, 13, 17. 33)'; for mind,
contribute towards awakening, animating, and knowledge, and reason, constitute the essence of
purifying man's moral conduct. (i. 17. 15, 29. 58, God, and are identical with the essenceofgood. (ii.8.
ii. 19.'10; comp. iv. 8. 24, 6. 24.) 1, &c.) Let us therefore invoke God's assistance in
The true Cynic-and' he is the same as the our strife after the good (ii. 18. 29, comp. i. 6. 21),
Stoic, the philosopher,-is. in the opinion-of Epic- let us emulate him (ii. 14. 13), let us purify that
tetus a messenger of Zeus, sent tomen to deliver which is our guide within us (iii. 22. 19), and let
them from their erroneous notions about good and us be pure with the pure within us, and with the
evil, and about happiness and unhappiness (iii. 22. Deity! (ii. 18. 19.)
23), and to lead them back into themselves. (ib. The prophet within us, who announces to us the
39.) For' this purpose he'requires natural grace- nature of good and evil (ii. 7. 2), is the daemon,
fillness and acuteness of intellect (ib. 90), for his the divine part of every one, his never-resting and
words are to produce a lively impression. incorruptible guardian. (i. 14. 12.) He manifests
The beginning of philosophy, according to him, himself in our opinions, which have something
is the perception' of'one's'own weakness and of common'with one another and are agreeing with
one's inability to do that which. is needful. (ii. 11. one another (i. 22. 1); for they are the things which
1; comp. iii. 23. 34, ii. 17. 1.) Along with this are self-evident, and which we feel obliged to carry
perception we become aware of the contest which into action, though we may combat them. (ii. 20.
is going on among men, and we grow anxious to 1.) That which is good we must recognize as
ascertain the cause of it, and consequently to dis- such a thing: wherever it appears, it draws us tocover a standard by which we may give our deci- wards itself, and it is impossible to reject the consion (ii. 11. 13, &c.): to meditate upon this and ception of good. (iii. 3. 4, comp. i. 4. 1.) The opito dwell upon it, is called philosophizing. (ib. 24; nions just described are the helps which nature has
comp. iii. L0. 6.) The things which are to be given to every one for discovering that which is
measured are conceptions, which form the material; true. (iv. 1. 51.) Wherever they are not recogthe work which is to be constructed out of them, nized, as is the case with the followers of the New
is their just and natural application, and a con- Academy, our mind and modesty become petrified.
trol over them; (iii. 22. 20, 23. 42.) This just (i.' 5. 3.) To investigate this criticism of what is
choice of conceptions and our consent to or decision in accordance with nature, and to master it
in their favour (7rpoaepecns, o'vycaTdcOeorts), consti- in its application to individual things, is the
tute the nature of good.' (ii. 1. 4, 19. 32.) Only object of all our scientific'endeavours (i. 11. 15),
that which is subject: to our choice or decision is and' ths mastery is obtained' only by the cultivagood or' evil; all the rest is neither good nor evil; tion of our mind and by education. (7rai&eSa; i. 2.
it concerns us not, it is beyond our reach (i. 13. 9, 6, 22. 9, ii. 17. 7.) The practice in theory is the
25. 1, ii. 5. 4); it is something external, merely a easier part; the application in life is the more difsubject for our choice (i. 29. 1, ii. 16. 1, 19. 32, ficult one, and is the object of all theory. (i. 26. 3,
iv. 10. 26); in itself it is indifferent, but its appli- 29. 35.) We find that as far as practical application is not indifferent (ii. 5. 1, 6. 1), and its ap- cation is concerned, many men are Epicureans and
plication is either consistent with or contrary to effeminate Peripatetics, though they profess the
nature. (ii. 5. 24.) The choice, and consequently doctrines of the Stoics and Cynics. (ii. 19. 20, 12.