A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology. By various writers. Ed. by William Smith. Illustrated by numerous engravings on wood.

HANNIBAL. HANNIBAL. 337:
-:ubmission of the Samnites, he pushed forward into decisive'. events. Casilinum had fallen in the
Campania, and though foiled in the. attempt to -course of the winter, and with the advance of
make himself master of Neapolis, which had been spring:Hannibal took up his camp on Mount
the immediate object of his advance, he was more Tifata, where, while awaiting the arrival of reinthan compensated by the acquisition of Capua (a forcements from Carthage, he was at hand to supcity scarcely inferior to Rome itself in importance), port his partisans in Campania, and oppose the
the gates of which were -opened to him by the Roman generals in that province. But his attempts
popular party. Here, after reducing the small on Cumae and Neapolis were foiled; and even after
towns of Nuceria and Acerrae, he established his he had been joined by a force from Carthage (very
army in winter-quarters; while he, at the same inferior, however, to what he had expected), he
time, carried on the siege of Casilinum, a small but sustained a repulse before Nola, which was magnistrong fortress in the immediate neighbourhood. fled by the Romans into a defeat. As the winter
(Liv. xxii. 58, 61, xxiii. 1-10, 14-18; Zonar. approached, he withdrew into Apulia, and took up
ix. 1, 2; Plut. Fab..17.) his quarters in the plains around Arpi. But other
Capua was celebrated for its wealth and luxury, prospects were already opening before him; in his
and the enervating effect which these produced camp on Tifata he had received embassies from
upon the army of Hannibal became a favourite Philip, king of Macedonia, and Hieronymus of
theme of rhetorical exaggeration in later ages. Syracuse, both of which he had eagerly welcomed;
(Zonar. ix. 3; Florus, ii. 6.) The futility of and thus sowed the seeds of two fresh wars, and
such declamations is sufficiently shown by the raised up two formidable enemies against the
simple fact that the superiority' of that army in Roman power. (Liv. xxiii. 19, 20, 30 —-39, 41 —
the field remained as decided as ever. -Still it may 46; xxiv. 6; Plut. Marc. 10-12 -; Polyb. vii. 2,
be truly said that the winter spent at Capua, B. c. 9; Zonar. ix..4.)
216-215, was in great measure the turning point These two collateral wars in some degree drew
of Hannibal's fortune, and from this time the war off the attention of both parties from that in Italy
assumed an altered character. The experiment of itself; yet the Romans still opposed to the Carwhat he could effect with his single army had now thaginian general a chain of armies which hampered
been fully tried, and, notwithstanding all his vic- all his operations; and though Hannibal was ever
tories, it had decidedly failed;for Rome was still on the watch for the opportunity of striking. a'
unsubdued,' and still provided with the means of blow, the campaign of 214 was still less decisive
maintaining a protracted contest. But Hannibal than that of the preceding year. Early in the
had not relied on his own forces alone, and he now summer he advanced from Apulia to his former
found himself, apparently at least, in a condition station on Mount Tifata, to watch over the safety
to commence the execution of his long-cherished of Capua; from thence he had descended to the
plan, -that of arming Italy itself against the Ro- Lake Avernus, in hopes of making himself master
mans, and crushing the ruling powrer by means of of Puteoli, when a prospect was held out to him of
her own subjects. It was to this object that his surprising the important city of Tarentum. Thither
attention was henceforth mainly directed; and he hastened by forced marches, but arrived too
hence, even when apparently inactive, he was, in late,-Tarentum had been secured by a Roman
reality, occupied with the most important schemes, force. After this his operations were of little imand busy in raising up fresh foes to overwhelm his portance, until he again took up his winter-quarters
antagonists. From this time, also, the Romans in Apulia. (Liv. xxiv. 12, 13, 17, 20.)
in great measure changed their plan of operations, During. the following summer (B. c. 213), while
and, instead of opposing to Hannibal one great all eyes were turned towards the war in Sicily,
army in the field, they hemmed in his move- Hannibal remained almost wholly inactive in the
ments on all sides, guarded all- the most important neighbourhood of Tarentum, the hopes he still
towns with strong garrisons, and kept up an army entertained of making himself master of that imin every province of Italy, to thwart the opera- portant city rendering him unwilling to quit that
tions of his:lieutenants, and check the rising dis- quarter of Italy. Fabius, who was opposed to him,:
position to revolt. It is impossible here to follow in was equally inefficient; and the capture of Arpi,
detail the complicated movements of the subse- which was betraved into his hands, was the onlyquent campaigns, during which Hannibal himself advantage he was able to gain.- But before the
frequently traversed Italy in all directions, appear- close of the ensuing winter Hannibal was rewarded
ing suddenly wherever his presence was called for, with the long-looked-for prize, and Tarentum was
and astonishing, and often baffling, the enemy by betrayed into his hands by Nicon and Philemenus.
the rapidity of his marches. Still less can we ad- The advantage, however, was still incomplete, for
vert to all the successes or defeats of his generals, a Roman garrison still held possession of the citathough these of necessity often influenced his own del, from which he was unable to dislodge them.
operations. All that we can do is, to. notice very (Polyb. viii. 26-36; Liv. xxiv. 44-47; xxv. 1,
briefly the leading events'which distinguished 8-11; Appian, Annib. 31-33.)
each successive campaign. But it is necessary to The next -year (212) was marked by important
bear in mind,' if we would rightly estimate the events. In Sicily, on the one hand, the fall of
character and genius of Hannibal, that it was not Syracuse more than counterbalanced the acquisition
only where he was present in person that his suo of Tarentum; while in Spain, on the contrary, the
periority made itself felt: as Polybius has justly defeat and death of the two Scipios [HAsDIRuremarked (ix. 22), he was at once the author and BAL, No. 6] seemed to establish the superiority of
the presiding spirit of all that was done in this Carthage in that country, and open the way to.war against the Roman power, - in Sicily and in Hasdrubal to join his brother in Italy; a movement
Macedonia, as well as in Italy itself, from one ex- which Hannibal appears to have been already long
tremity of the peninsula to the other. expecting. Meanwhile, the two consuls, emThe campaign of 215 was not marked by any boldened by the apparent inactivity' of the. Cartha:
VOL. II. z