A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology. By various writers. Ed. by William Smith. Illustrated by numerous engravings on wood.

V80 DEMOSTHENES.
ing heard that the whole remaining force of Ambracia was advancing in support, he succeeded
further in waylaying and almost exterminating it
in the battle of Idomene. The Athenians received
a third part of the spoils, and the amount may be
estimated from the fact, that the share of Demosthenes, the only portion that reached Athens in
safety, was no less than 300 panoplies. (Thuc. iii.
102, 105-114; Diod. xii. 60.)
Demosthenes might now safely venture home:
and in the next year he was allowed, at his own
request, though not in office, to accompany Eurymedon and Sophocles, the commanders of a squadron
destined for Sicily, and empowered to use their
services for any object he chose on the Peloponnesian coast. They, however, would not hear of any
delay, and it was only by the chance of stress of
weather, which detained the fleet at Pylos, his
choice for his new design, that he was enabled to
effect his purpose. The men themselves while
waiting, took the fancy to build him his fort; and
in it he was left with five ships. Here he was
assailed by the Lacedaemonians, whom the news had
recalled out of Attica, and from Corcyra, and here
with great spirit and success he defeated their attempt to carry the place on the sea side. The arrival
of forty Athenian ships, for which he had sent, and
their success in making their way into the harbour,
reversed his position. The Lacedaemonians, who
-in their siege of the place had occupied the neighbouring island, were now cut off and blockaded,
and Sparta now humbled herself to ask for peace.
The arrogance of the people blighted this promise;
and as the winter approached it became a question
whether the whole advantage was not likely to belost by the escape of the party. Demosthenes,
however, was devising an expedient, when joined
or rather, in fact, superseded by Cleon [CLEON],
who nevertheless was shrewd enough not to interfere, possibly had even had intimation of it throughout. His Aetolian disaster had taught him the value
of light and the weakness of heavy arms. Landing at two points with a force of which one-third
only were full-armed, by a judicious distribution
of his troops, and chiefly by the aid of his archers
and targeteers. he effected the achievement, then
almost incredible, of forcing the Spartans to lay
down their arms. (Thuc. iv. 2-40; Diod. xii.
61-63.)
The glory of this success was with the vulgar
given to Cleon, yet Demosthenes must have
surely had some proportion of it. He was probably henceforth in general esteem, as in the
Knights of Aristophanes, coupled at the head of
the list of the city's generals with the high-born
and influential Nicias. We find him in the following year (B. c. 424) commanding with Hippocrates
in the operation in the Megarid; possessing himself by a stratagem of the Long Walls uniting
Megara to Nisaea, and receiving shortly the submission of Nisaea itself, though baffled by the advance
of Brasidas in the main design on Megara. Soon
after, he concerted with the same colleague a grandattempt on Boeotia. On a fixed day Hippocrates
was to lead the whole Athenian force into the
south-eastern frontier, and occupy Delium, while
Demosthenes was to land at Siphae, and by the
aid of the democratic party, possess himself of it
and of Chaeroneia. Demosthenes with this view
took forty ships to Naupactus, and, having raised
forces in Acarnania, sailed for Siphae. But either

DEMOSTiENES.
he or Hippocrates had mistaken the day; his
arrival was too early, and the Boeotians, who had
moreover received information of the plot, were
enabled to bring their whole force against Demosthenes, and yet be in time to meet his colleague at
Delium. The whole design was thus overthrown,
and Demosthenes was further disgraced by a repulse in a descent on the territory of Sicyon.
(Thuc. iv. 66-74, 76, 77, 89, 101; Diod. xii.
66-69.)
He does not reappear in history, except among the
signatures to the treaties of the tenth year, B. c. 422
(Thuc. v. 19, 24), till the nineteenth, B. c. 413. On
the arrival of the despatch from Nicias giving an account of the relief of Syracuse by Gylippus, he was
appointed with Eurymedon to the command of the
reinforcements, and, while the latter went at once
to Sicily, he remained at home making the needfiul
preparations. Early in the spring he set sail with
sixty-five ships; and after some delays, how far
avoidable we cannot say, at Aegina and Corcyra,
on the coasts of Peloponnesus and of Italy, reached
Syracuse a little too late to prevent the first naval
victory of the besieged. (Thuc. vii. 16, 17, 20,
26, 31, 33, 35, 42.)
The details of this concluding portion of the
Syracusan expedition cannot be given in a life of
Demosthenes. His advice, on his arrival, was to
make at once the utmost use of their own present
strength and their enemies' consternation, and
then at once, if they failed, to return. No immediate conclusion of the siege could be expected
without the recovery of the high ground commanding the city, Epipolae. After some unsuccessful
attempts by day, Demosthenes devised and put
into effect a plan for an attack, with the whole
forces, by night. It was at first signally successful, but the tide was turned by the resistance of a
body of Boeotians, and the victory changed to a
disastrous defeat. Demosthenes now counselled
an immediate departure, either to Athens, or, if
Nicias, whose professions of greater acquaintance.
with the internal state of the besieged greatly influenced his brother generals, really had grounds
for hope, at any rate from their present unhealthy
position to the safe and wholesome situation of
Thapsus. Demosthenes reasoned in vain: then
ensued the fatal delay, the return of Gylippus wikh
fresh reinforcements, the late consent of Nicias to
depart, and the infatuated recal of it on the eclipse
of the moon, the' first defeat and the second of
the all-important ships. In the latter engagement Demosthenes had the chief command, and
retained even in the hour of disaster sufficient
coolness to see that the only course remaining
was at once to make a fresh attempt to break
through the blockading ships and force their
way to sea. And he had now the voice of Nicias
with him: the army itself in desperation refused.
In the subsequent retreat by the land, Demosthenes for some time is described simply as cooperating.with Nicias, though with the separate
command of the second and rearward division.
This, on the sixth day, through its greater exposure to the enemy, was unable to keep up with
the other; and Demosthenes, as in his position
was natural, looked more to defence against the
enemy, while Nicias thought only of speedy retreat. The consequence was that, having fallen
about five miles and a half behind, he was surrounded and driven into a plot of ground planted