A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology. By various writers. Ed. by William Smith. Illustrated by numerous engravings on wood.

976 DEMOCRITUS.
made the discovery of causes the highest object
of scientific investigations. He once said, that he
preferred the discovery of a true cause to the possesssion of the kingdom of Persia. (Dionys. Alex.
ap. Euseb. Praep. Evang. xiv. 27.) We must not,
therefore, take the word chance (T7uvy) in its vulgar acceptation, (Brandis, 1. c. p. 319.) Aristotle
understood Democritus rightly in this respect
(Phys. Auscult. ii. 4, p. 196. 11; Simplic. fol. 74),
as he generally valued him highly, and often says
of him, that he had thought on all subjects, searched after the first causes of phaenomena, and endeavoured to find definitions. (De Generat. et Corrupt.
i. 2, 8, Metaph. M. 4, Phys. ii. 2, p. 194, 20, de
Part. Anim. i. p. 642, 26.) The only thing for
which he censures him, is a disregard for teleological relations, and the want of a comprehensive system of induction. (DeRespir. 4, de Generat. Aniam.
v. 8.) Democritus himself called the common notion of chance a cover of human ignorance (Trpo'a-riv 18-is advofls), and an invention of those who
were too idle to think. (Dionys. ap. Euseb. Praep.
Evang. xiv. 27; Stob. Eclog. Eth. p. 344.)
Besides the infinite number of atoms existing in
infinite space, Democritus also supposed the existence of an infinite number of worlds, some of which
resembled one another, while others differed from
one another, and each of these worlds was kept
together as one thing by a sort of shell or skin.
He derived the four elements from the form of the
atoms predominating in each, from their quality,
and their relations of magnitude. In deriving individual things from atoms, he mainly considered
the qualities of warm and cold. The warm or firelike he took to be a combination of fine, spheric,
and very movable atoms, as opposed to the cold
and moist. His mode of proceeding, however,
was, first carefully to observe and describe the
phaenomena themselves, and then to attempt his
atomistic explanation, whereby he essentially advanced the knowledge of nature. (Papencordt, 1. c.
p. 45, &c.; Brandis, 1. c. p. 327.) He derived the
soul, the origin of life, consciousness, and thought,
from the finest fire-atoms (Aristot. de Animn. i. 2,
ed. Trendelenburg); and in connexion with this
theory he made very profound physiological investigations. It was for this reason that, according
to him, the soul while in the body acquires perceptions and knowledge by corporeal contact, and that
it is affected by heat and cold. The sensuous perceptions themselves were to him affections of the
organ or of the subject perceiving, dependent on
the changes of bodily condition, on the difference
of the organs and their quality, on air and light.
Hence the differences, e. g., of taste, colour, and
temperature, are only conventional (Sext. Empir.
adv. Math. vii. 135), the real cause of those differences being in the atoms.
It was very natural, therefore, that Democritus
described even the knowledge obtained by sensuous
perception as obscure (raKorirTv KpLatv). A clear
and pure knowledge is only that which has reference to the true principles or the true nature of
things, that is, to the atoms and space. But
knowledge derived from reason was, in his opinion,
not specifically different from that acquired through
the senses; for conception and reflection were to
him only effects of impressions made upon the
senses; and Aristotle, therefore, expressly states,
that Democritus did not consider mind as something peculiar, or as a power distinct from the soul

DEMOCRITUS.
or sensuous perception, but that he considerd
knowledge derived from reason to be sensuous
perceptions. (De Anim. i. 2. p. 404,27.) A purer
and higher knowledge which he opposed to the
obscure knowledge obtained through the medium
of the senses, must therefore have been to him a
kind of sensation, that is, a direct perception of
the atoms and of space. For this reason he assumed the three criteria (Kptrjpia): a. Phaenomena as criteria for discovering that which is hidden: b. Thought as a criterion of investigation:
and c. Assertions as criteria of desires. (Sext.
Emp. adv. Math. vii. 140; Brandis, 1. c. p. 334.)
Now as Democritus acknowledged the uncertainty
of perceptions, and as he was unable to establish a
higher and purely spiritual source of knowledge as
distinct from perceptions, we often find him complaining that all human knowledge is uncertain,
that in general either nothing is absolutely true,
or at least not clear to us (&0qAov, Aristot. Metaph.
r. 5), that our senses grope about in the dark
(sensus tenebricosi, Cic. Acad. iv. 10, 23), and that
all our views and opinions are subjective, and come
to us only like something epidemic, as it were,
with the air which we breathe. (Sext. Emp. adv.
Mati. vii. 136, 137, viii. 327, Hypotyp. i. 213;
Diog. Labrt. ix. 72, 4ey)' oeiv i0s JLE, iyv 3v6e
yap a dAaiOEta, which Cicero translates in profundo
veritatem esse.)
In his ethical philosophy Democritus considered
the acquisition of peace of mind (e0Ovila) as the
end and ultimate object of our actions. (Diog.
Laert. ix. 45; Cic. de Fin. v. 29.) This peace,
this tranquillity of the mind, and freedom from
fear (p(6os and elori8aotsovia) and passion, is the
last and fairest fruit of philosophical inquiry.
Many of his ethical writings had reference to this
idea and its establishment, and the fragments relating to this question are full of the most genuine
practical wisdom. Abstinence from too many occupations, a steady consideration of one's own
powers, which prevents our attempting that which
we cannot accomplish, moderation in prosperity and
misfortune, were to him the principal means of acquiring the evsOvfia. The noblest and purest ethical tendency, lastly, is manifest in his views on
virtue and on good. Truly pious and beloved by
the gods, he says, are only those who hate that
which is wrong (d'oes CXOpdv r duKelv). The
purest joy and the truest happiness are only the
fruit of the higher mental activity exerted in the
endeavour to understand the nature of things, of
the peace of mind arising from good actions, and
of a clear conscience. (Brandis, 1. c. p. 337.)
The titles of the works which the ancients ascribed to Democritus may be found in Diogenes
La'rtius. We find among them: 1. Works of
ethics and practical philosophy. 2. On natural
science. 3. On mathematics and astronomy.
4. On music and poetry, on rhythm and poetical
beauty (Bode, Gesch. der -Iellen. Dichtkunst. i. p.
24, &c.), and on Homer. 5. Works of a linguistic
and grammatical nature; for Democritus is one of
the earliest Greek philosophers that made language
the subject of his investigations. (Lersch, Sprachphilosophie der Alten, i. p. 13, &c.) 6. Works on
medicine, 7. On agriculture. 8. On painting.
9. On mythology, history, &c. He had even
occupied himself, with success, with mechanics;
and Vitruvius (Proaf lib. vii.; comp. Senec. Epist.
90) ascribes to him certain inventions, for example,