A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology. By various writers. Ed. by William Smith. Illustrated by numerous engravings on wood.

876 CRASSUS.
dream the night before, invited the consuls to be
reconciled before they left office. Pompey remained cold and inflexible, but Crassus took the
first step by offering his hand to his rival, in the
midst of general acclamations. The reconciliation
was hollow, for the jealousy of Crassus continued.
He privily opposed the Gabinian rogation, which
commissioned Pompey to clear the sea of pirates;
and Cicero's support of the Manilian law, which
conferred the command against Mithridates upon
Pompey, rankled in the mind of Crassus. When
Pompey returned victorious, Crassus, from timidity
or disgust, retired for a time from Rome.
In the year B. C. 65, Crassus was censor with
Q. Catulus, the firm supporter of the senate; but
the censors, in consequence of their political discordance, passed the period of their office without
holding a census or a muster of the equites. In
the following year, Crassus failed in his wish to
obtain the rich province of Egypt.
Crassus was suspected by some, probably without sufficient reason, of being privy to the first
conspiracy of Catiline; and again, in the year B. c.
63, L. Tarquinius, when he was arrested on his
way to Catiline, affirmed that he was sent by
Crassus with a message inviting Catiline to come
with speed to the rescue of his friends at Rome;
but the senate denounced the testimony of L. Tarquinius as a calumny, and Crassus himself attributed the charge to the subornation of Cicero.
(Sall. B. C. 48.) The interests of Crassus were
opposed to the success of the conspiracy; for it
would have required a man of higher order to
seize and retain the helm in the confusion that
would have ensued.
In the whole intercourse between Crassus and
Cicero may be observed a real coldness, with occasional alternations of affected friendship. (Comp.
Cic. ad A t. i. 14 and 16, ad Fam. xiv. 2, pro
Sext. 17, ad Fam. i. 9. ~ 6, v. 8.) In his
intercourse with others, Crassus was equally unsteady in his likings and enmities. They were, in
fact, not deeply-seated, and, without the practice
of much hypocrisy, could be assumed or withdrawn
as temporary expediency might suggest.
It was from motives of self-interest, without
actual community of feeling or purpose, that the
so-called triumvirate was formed between Caesar,
Pompey, and Crassus. Each hoped to gain the
first place for himself by using the others for his
purposes, though there can be no doubt that the
confederacy was really most profitable to Caesar,
and that, of the three, Crassus would have been
the least able to rule alone. Caesar had already
found Crassus a convenient friend; for in B. c. 61,
when Caesar was about to proceed to his province
in Further Spain, Crassus became security for his
debts to a large amount. It may, at first view,
excite surprise that a person of so little independent
greatness as Crassus should have occupied the
position that he filled, and that men of wider
capacity should have entered into a compact to
share with him the honours and profits of the
commonwealth. But the fact is to be accounted
for by considering, that the character of Crassus
represented in many points a large portion of
the public. While the young, the daring and
the ambitious, the needy, the revolutionary,
and the democratic, adhered to Caesar,--while
the aristocracy, the party of the old constitution, those who affected the reputation of high

CRASSUS.
principle and steady virtue, looked with greater
favour upon Pompey,-there was a considerable
mass of plain, moderate, practical men, who saw
much that they liked in Crassus. Independently
of the actual influence which he acquired by the
means we have explained, he had the sympathy
of those who, without being noble, were jealous
of the nobility, and were rich or were occupied
in making money. They sympathised with him,
because the love of gain was a strong trait in the
Roman character, and they saw that his unequivocal success in his pursuit was a proof of at
least one unquestionable talent-a talent of the
most universal practical utility. He was not
without literary acquirement, for, under the teaching of the Peripatetic Alexander, he had gained
a moderate proficiency in history and philosophy.
There was no profligacy in his private conduct
to shock decent and respectable mediocrity. He
was not above ordinary comprehension. The many
could appreciate a worldly and vulgar-minded but
safe man, whose principles sat loosely but conveniently upon him, who was not likely to innovate
rashly, to dazzle by eccentric brilliancy, or to put
to shame by an overstrained rigidity of virtue.
Thus it was more prudent to combine with Crassus as an ally, than to incur the opposition of his
party,. and to risk the counter-influence of an
enormous fortune, which made the name of Crassus proverbial for wealth. Pliny (H. N. xxxiii.
47) values his estates in the country alone at two
hundred millions of sesterces. He might have
maintained no despicable army at his own cost.
Without the means of doing this, he thought that
no one deserved to be called rich. In other less
stirring times he might have lived and died without leaving in history any marked traces of his
existence; but in the period of transition and
commotion which preceded the fall of the republic,
such elements of power as he possessed could
scarcely remain neglected and quiescent.
It was part of the triumviral contract-renewed
at an interview between the parties in Luca-that
Pompey and Crassus should be a second time consuls together, should share the armies and provinces of the ensuing year, and should exert their
influence to secure the prolongation for five years
of Caesar's command in Gaul. Notwithstanding
the strenuous opposition of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, backed by all the authority of Cato of
Utica (who was forced on the day of election to
leave the Field of Mars with his followers after a
scene of serious riot and uproar), both Pompey
and Crassus were elected consuls, B. c. 55. A law
was passed at the rogation of the tribune C. Trebonius, by which Syria and the two Spains, with
the right of peace and war, were assigned to the
consuls for five years, while the Gauls and Illyricum were handed over to Caesar for a similar
period. In the distribution of the consular provinces, Crassus took Syria.
Crassus was anxious to distinguish himself in
war. Pompey, he saw, had subjugated the Pirates
and Mithridates: Caesar had conquered Gaul, and
was marching his army victoriously to Germany
and Britain. Mortified at successes which made
him feel his inferiority to both, he chose rather to
enter upon an undertaking for which he had no
genius than to continue the pursuit of wealth and
influence at home. Armed by the lex Trebonia
with power to make war, he determined to exer