A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology. By various writers. Ed. by William Smith. Illustrated by numerous engravings on wood.

CAESAR.
The victories of the preceding year had determined the fate of Gaul; but many states still remained in arms, and entered into fresh conspiracies
during the winter. The next year, B. c. 51, Caesar's eighth campaign in Gaul, was occupied in the
reduction of these states, into the particulars of
which we need not enter. It is sufficient to say,
that he conquered in succession the Carnutes, the
Bellovaci, and the Armoric states in western Gaul,
took Uxellodunum, a town of the Cadurci (Cahors),
and closed the campaign by the reduction of
Aquitania. He then led his troops into winterquarters, and passed the winter at Nemetocenna in
Belgium. He here employed himself in the pacification of Gaul; and, as he already saw that his
presence would soon be necessary in Italy, he was
anxious to remove all causes for future wars. He
accordingly imposed no new taxes, treated the
states with honour and respect, and bestowed great
presents upon the chiefs. The experience of the
last two years had taught the Gauls that they had
no hope of contending successfully against Caesar;
and as he now treated them with mildness, they
were the more readily induced to submit patiently
to the Roman yoke. Having thus completed the
pacification of Gaul, Caesar found that he could
leave his army in the spring of B. c. 50, and therefore, contrary to his usual practice, repaired at the
end of the winter to Cisalpine Gaul.
While Caesar had thus been actively engaged
in Gaul during the last two years, affairs at Rome
had taken a turn, which threatened a speedy rupture between him and Pompey. The death of
Crassus in the Parthian war in B. c. 53 had left
Caesar and Pompey alone at the head of the state.
Pompey had been the chief instrument in raising
Caesar to power in order to serve his own ends,
and never seems to have supposed it possible
that the conqueror of Mithridates could be thrown
into the shade by any man in the world. This,
however, now began to be the case; Caesar's brilliant victories in Gaul were in every body's
mouth; and Pompey saw with ill-disguised
mortification that he was becoming the second
person in the state. Though this did not lead
him to break with Caesar at once, it made him
anxious to increase his power and influence,
and he had therefore resolved as early as B. c. 53
to obtain, if possible, the dictatorship. He accordingly used no effort to put an end to the disturbances at Rome between Milo and Clodius in
that 'year, in hopes that all parties would be
willing to accede to his wishes in order to restore
peace to the city. These disturbances broke out
into perfect anarchy on the death of Clodius at
the beginning of the following year, B. c. 52, and
led to the appointment of Pompey as sole consul
with the concurrence of the senate. This, it is true,
did not entirely meet Pompey's wishes, yet it was
the first step which the aristocracy had taken to
gratify Pompey, and it paved the way for a reconciliation with them. The acts of Pompey's consulship, which were all directed to the increase of his
power, belong to Pompey's life; it is sufficient
to mention here, that among other things he obtained the prolongation of his government in Spain
for five years more; and as he was not yet prepared to break entirely with Caesar, he allowed
some of the tribunes to carry a law exempting
Caesar from the necessity of coming to Rome to
become a candidate for the consulship. The ten

CAESAR. 549
years of Caesar's government would expire at the
end of B. c. 49, and he was therefore resolved to
obtain the consulship for B. c. 48, for otherwise he
would become a private man.
In the following year, B. c. 51, Pompey entered
into still closer connexions with the aristocracy,
but at the same time was not willing to support all
the violent measures of the consul M. Claudius
Marcellus, who proposed to send a successor to Caesar, on the plea that the war in Gaul was finished,
and to deprive him of the privilege of becoming a candidate for the consulship in his absence. At length
a decree of the senate was passed, that the consuls
of the succeeding year, B. c. 50, should on the
first of March consult the senate respecting the
disposal of the consular provinces, by which time
it was hoped that Pompey would be prepared to
take decisive measures against Caesar. The consuls for the next year, B. c. 50, L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Claudius Marcellus, and the powerful
tribune C. Curio, were all reckoned devoted partizans of Pompey and the senate. Caesar, however,
gained over Paullus and Curio by large bribes, and
with an unsparing hand distributed immense sums
of money among the leading men of Rome. Thus
this year passed by without the senate coming to
any decision. The great fear which Pompey and
the senate entertained was, that Caesar should be
elected consul while he was still at the head of his
army, and it was therefore proposed in the senate
by the consul C. Marcellus, that Caesar should lay
down his command by the 13th of November.
This it could not be expected that Caesar would do;
his proconsulate had upwards of another year to
run; and if he had come to Rome as a private man
to sue for the consulship, there can be little doubt
that his life would have been sacrificed. Cato had
declared that he would bring Caesar to trial as
soon as he laid down his command; but the trial
would have been only a mockery, for Pompey was
in the neighbourhood of the city at the head of an
army, and would have overawed the judges by his
soldiery as at Milo's trial. The tribune Curio
consequently interposed his veto upon the proposition of Marcellus. Meantime Caesar had come
into Cisalpine Gaul in the spring of B. c. 50, as already mentioned. Here he was received by the
municipal towns and colonies with the greatest
marks of respect and affection; and after remaining there a short time, he returned to Transalpine Gaul and held a review of his whole army,
which he had so long led to victory. Anxious to
diminish the number of his troops, the senate had,
under pretext of a war with the Parthians, ordered
that Pompey and Caesar should each furnish a.
legion to be sent into the East. The legion which
Pompey intended to devote to this service was the
one he had lent to Caesar in B. c. 53, and which
he now accordingly demanded back; and although
Caesar saw that he should thus be deprived of two
legions, which would probably be employed against
himself, he did not think it advisable to break with.
the senate on this point, and felt that lie was sufficiently strong to spare even two legions. He accordingly sent them to the senate, after bestowing liberal presents upon each soldier. Upon their arrival
in Italy, they were not, as Caesar had anticipated,
sent to the East, but were ordered to pass the
winter at Capua. After this Caesar stationed his
remaining eight legions in winter-quarters, four in
Belgium and four among the Aedui, and then re