A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology. By various writers. Ed. by William Smith. Illustrated by numerous engravings on wood.

ARISTOTELES.
1. There is a science which considers existe
as such, and the definitions pertaining to ii
such. 2. It is not the same with any one of
particular sciences, for all these consider onl
part of what exists and its attributes. 3. '
principles and highest causes of things must hai
nature appropriate only to them.
Existence is indeed defined in various ways,
denotes at one time the What and the idea,
another time the condition or constitution, ma
tude, &c., of a thing; of all the definitions, h
ever, the What, which denotes the substance
the first. (Miet. vii. 1. p. 1028, Bekk.) All o
definitions only state attributes or qualities of
first definition, and are not in their nature i:
pendent, or capable of being separated from
substance. On the other hand, the idea of
stance (ovrioa) lies at the foundation of our ide;
everything, and we do not arrive at the cogni
of anything when we know how great, or wlb
&c., it is, but when we know wChat it is.
question, therefore, is, What is the substas
(ris ri oo-ria;) which has ever been the ol
of philosophical investigation. (Met. vii. 1
1028.) Aristotle distinguishes three kindE
substances: 1. Substance perceptible by the se
(Met. xii. 1, 2, vii. 7), which is finite and
rishable, like single sensible objects. The
menta of this sensible substance are, - a.
matter, that which is fundamental, constant
particular things, the negative in relation to
other; e. the motive principle, the pure fort
elJos. 2. The second higher kind of substant
that which may be perceived by the senses, b
imperishable, such as the heavenly bodies. I
the active principle (ivepyeia, actus) steps
which, in so far as it contains that which is t
produced, is understanding (voils). That whi
contains is the purpose, which is realized by mn
of the Eivpyeta. The two extremes are here
tentiality and agency (matter and thought).
passive universal and the active universal.
two are not subject to change. That whi(
changed is the particular thing, and passes
one into the other by means of something else
which it is moved. The purpose, in so far
is the motive principle, is called the cause (dp
but, in so far as it is the purpose, it is the rec
alrtia. (Met. v. 1, 2.) The active principle
reality to that which it contains in itself: thiE
mains the same: it is still, however, matter, w
is different from the active principle, though
are combined. That which combines them is
form, the union of both. The relation of
newly coined idea of 4vrEiXeXea, or the pui
realized by the formative principle, to the id
EPepyeia, is this: ITEAEXELta signifies in the
ferent grades of existence the completion whi
in conformity with each single existing tt
and Evipyeia denotes the actuality which
conformity with this completion. (Metaph. i
p. 179. 8, Brand.) Thus the soul is essenl
eirTAeXeia.*

ARISTOTELES. 337
3. The third kind of substance is that in which
Livagfus, evipyeia, and iserXeXsia are united; the
absolute substance; the eternal, unmoved; but which
is at the same time motive, is pure activity (actus
purus, Met. xii. 6, ix. 8, xii. 7), is God himself.
This substance is without matter, and so also is
not a magnitude.
The chief momentum in the Aristotelian philosophy is, that thought and the subject of thought
are one; that what is objective and thought (the
EiVep'ya) are one and the same. God himself is
eternal thought, and his thought is operation, life,
action,-it is the thought of thought.- Objects
exist in their truth only in so far as they are the
subjects of thought, are thoughts. That is their
essence (oaiara). In nature, indeed, the idea
exists not as a thought, but as a body; it has,
however, a soul, and this is its idea. In saying
this, Aristotle stands upon the highest point of
speculation: God, as a living God, is the universe.
In the course of the investigation, Aristotle, with
careful regard to, and examination of, the views of
earlier philosophers, points out that neither abstractly universal, nor particular, sensuously perceptible essences can be looked upon as principles
of existence. Neither the universal apart from the
particular, nor the particular by itself, can be a
principle of the natural and spiritual world; but
the absolute principle is God,-the highest reason,
the object of whose thought is himself. Thus the
dominion of the Anaxagorean vovs was declared in
a profounder manner by Aristotle. In the divine
thought, existence is at the same time implied.
Thought is the sum and substance of the universe,
and realizes itself in the eternal immutable formative principles which, as the essences indwelling
(imman'ent) in the material, fashion themselves so
as to assume an individual existence. In man, the
thought of the divine reason completes itself so as
to become the self-conscious activity of thinking
reason. By it he recognizes in the objective world
his own nature again, and so attains to the cognition of truth. With these slight intimations, we
must here leave the subject.
VIII. THE PARTiCULAR SCIENCES.
Respecting the Essence of the Particular Sciences,
and the division of them into Theoretical and Practical Sciences.-The science of the particular can
thing, the potentiality must pass into actuality.
The principle of the transition from the potential
to the actual in a thing Aristotle calls entelecheia
(ro iEvreXAs h'xov), because it unites both the
potentiality and the actuality. Every union of
potentiality and actuality is a motion, and accordingly the entelecheia is the principle of motion ( "
'roi avvdset OVros ETVEI'rXeXeC1a 7010 oTOV, Kivitsoo-ri). The potentiality (s'vagis) can never become actuality (icvoyeia) without entelecheia; but
the entelecheia also cannot dispense with the potentiality. If the entelecheia does not manifest itself
in a thing, it is merely a thing Ka'rca SlVayiv;
if it does manifest itself, it becomes a thing Icar'
ie'ipyemav. The same thing is often both together,
the former in reference to qualities which it has
not yet, but can obtain; the latter in reference to
attributes already actually present in it. (Buhle,
in Erschs and Gruber's Encyclopaidie.)
* Met. xii. p. 1074, Bekk., asrdy d'pa vooe eifirep
i-rl To Kpar'ri y r alTov o-r <'ny ) vdfscr-s, vo('-rews
ei;<r tS.
7

vives

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* The actuality of each thing presupposes an
original internal potentiality, which is in itself
only conceivable, not perceptible. The potentiality of a thing is followed by its actuality in
reference either to mere existence or to action.
This actuality is ivpyeta, anctus, and is perceptible.
Riut, that the potential thing may become a real