A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology. By various writers. Ed. by William Smith. Illustrated by numerous engravings on wood.

336 ARISTOTELES.
considered apart from its particular contents; it is
treated quite as a form, and the remark is at the
same time made, that for that very reason it as yet
supplies us with no knowledge (srir-rpn-7). But
because this abstract universal possesses greater
facilities for subjective cognition, Aristotle makes
the doctrine of the syllogism precede that of
proof, for according to him, proof is a particular
kind of conclusion. (Anal. pr. i. 4.) Accordingly,
together with the mode of its formation, he treats
of the figures of the syllogism, and the different
forms of conclusion in them. (cc. 1-27.) Then he
gives directions for finding with ease the syllogistic
figures for each problem that is proposed (eViropeiV),
and lastly shews how to refer given conclusions to
their principles, and to arrange them according to
premises. Thereupon, in the second book of the
Analytics, he treats of the complete conclusion
according to its peculiar determining principles
(Anal. ii. 1-15), points out errors and deficiencies
in concluding (cc. 16-21), and teaches how to
refer to the syllogistic figures incomplete arguments, which have for their object subjective conviction only. (cc. 22-27.)
We do not arrive at that conclusion which is
the foundation of knowledge till we arrive at
proof, i. e. a conclusion conveying a distinct
meaning (ovuXXoyaouOs eri'or-GJAovCos, drdsrieis),i
which proceeds from the essential definitions of
the matter in question. Proof, in order to lead
to objective truth, necessarily presupposes principles. Without an acquaintance with principles, we cannot attain to knowledge by means of
proof. Aristotle, therefore, treats first of the nature of principles. They are the Universal, which
serves as a medium through which alone we can
attain to knowledge; they have their certainty in
themselves, and are not susceptible of any additional
separate proof. In this point of view Aristotle
compares them with the immediate certainty of
sensuous perceptions. The reason (vois) and the
exertion of the reason (vovries), which is itself the
Universal, develops these principles (dpXds) out of
itself.
In proof we may distinguish three things:
1. That which is proved (Anal. post. i. 7), i. e.
that which is to pertain to some definite object
(ys'veC iv-l) considered in itself. 2. The principles
from which this is deduced. 3. The object, the
attributes of which are to be exhibited. According
to their subject-matter, proofs come into closer
relation to the particular sciences. Here the important point is, to know what science is more
accurate, and may be presupposed as the groundwork of another (-rporvpa ea-i). The knowledge
to which proof conducts by means of principles
(1Er-crrrJ) has for its object necessary existence;
conception (8d(a), on the other hand, has for its
object that which may be otherwise constituted.
After Aristotle, in the first book of the second
Analytics, has shewn how by means of proof we
may receive a knowledge that something is, and
why it is so, he considers that which we cannot get
at by means of proof, but which is necessary for the
complete development of our ideas, viz. the definition of that which is substantial, by means of which
we have stated what an object is. This is effected
by definition (odpur5oes'). The definition states what
the essence of a thing is, and is therefore always
universal and affirmative. It cannot be proved by
any conclusion, nor even be demonstrated by

ARISTOTELES.
means of induction. (Anal. post. ii. 7.) We find
out the essence of a thing only when we know the
essential attributes of the thing, and its existence
itself. Aristotle analyses the different kinds of
definition (Anal. post. ii. 10), then treats of the
individual causes (for the definition declares the
why of a thing with reference to its essence), and
lastly lays down the method of finding a correct
definition. (Anal. post. ii. 11, &c. ii. 13.) The object of definition is, to comprehend the whole according to its essential differences, and to refer
these again to the genus, in order by these means
to bring under contemplation the whole as a unity
consisting of mutually connected and dependent
members. One aid in definition is subdivision
(&,apea-cs). The definition must be clear and distinct. This distinctness is attained by endeavouring first to define the particular, in order to become
acquainted with the import of it in every species.
The use of definition is especially important in
proposing problems. (Anal. post. ii. 14.)
Aristotle, however, does not, either in his Metaphysics, or in the particular sciences, proceed according to the abstract forms of conclusion, as he
develops them in the Organon; but the definition
(ogieds) forms the central point in the further
prosecution of his philosophical investigations. He
forms his conception of the idea of a thing (-r ri
iqv elvea) in the identity of its existence and essence,
and so continually points out the universal in the
particular.
VII. METAPHYSICS.
The first philosophy (for such is the name Aristotle gives to what we call Metaphysics) is the
science of the first principles and causes of things.
(Met. ii. 3, 4.) It is theoretic science, and the
most excellent, but at the same time the most
difficult of all sciences, because its object, the universal, is removed as far as possible from the perceptions of the senses. (Met. i. 2.) It is, however,
at the same time the most accurate science, because
its subject-matter is most knowable; and the most
free, because it is sought solely for the sake of
knowledge.
There are four first causes or principles of things:
a. The substance and the idea (7i oo'ia ical Tv ri
7v deVam); b. The subject and the matter (7 'Avi
iKa Tob vhrouKeiijevov); c. The principle of motion
(OeEv 1' dpX4 r T mS cwKo'ews); d. The purpose and
the good (Tr o 6've ica Kl r 6 'yaOo0v). The earlier
philosophers (this Aristotle shews in the first book
of the Metaphysics) recognized indeed all these
classes singly, but neither distinctly nor in connexion. With full consciousness he declares, after
having developed the history of metaphysics from
the Ionian philosophers to Plato in bold and masterly outlines, that this science of the first philosophy had up to his time resembled a lisping child
(4/eX\tmopEv7y, Met. i. 10, p. 993, Bekk.).
The consciousness of the opposition between
truth existing in and for itself, and the cognition
of it, must necessarily be presupposed in all philosophizing. This consciousness, which has come out
in all its distinctness only in the philosophy of the
most recent times, Aristotle also possesses. But
he has it in the form of doubts (dropiat), which
rise against science itself and its definitions. These
doubts and questions, then, Aristotle considers on
all sides, and therefrom arrives at the following
result: