A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology. By various writers. Ed. by William Smith. Illustrated by numerous engravings on wood.

ARISTOTELES.
is that which is eternal, fundamental, whilst the
single object, fashioned so as to assume an individual existence is produced, and perishes. The material in which the negation is inherent, is the
potentiality (S'VaxLs), out of which the formative
principle, as an entelecheia, fashions itself into existence. This, as the full reality (ivEip-ya), is the
higher step in opposition to the mere potentiality.
According to these definitions, the Aristotelian
philosophy progresses genetically from the lower to
the higher, from the dUvasu to the rTEXEXELta of
that, 'of which the potential, according to its peculiarity, is capable. Thus by means of the Ef6l"*
the universe becomes a whole consisting of mutually connected members, in which these E'Mi
attain to full existence. In inorganic nature the
purpose is still identical with the necessity of the
matter; but in organic nature it comes into existence as the soul of the enlivened object (/uvX?).
The energy (ivEpyeta) of the soul is, as an entelecheia, thought, both vous,raOrc'Kos, since, as the
temporary activity of the mind, it is necessarily
dependent on the co-operation of the senses, and
voes ro7TLKOirS, i. e. cognoscent, self-acting reason,
in so far as, in the pure element of thought freed
from what is sensuous, it elevates the finite world
into cognoscible truth. From this exalted point of
view Aristotle regarded and subjected to inquiry
the entire empire of reality and life, as it had
developed itself up to his time in science, arts, and
politics.
VI. ARISTOTELIAN LOGIc.
Aristotle is the creator of the science of logic.
The two deepest thinkers of Germany, Kant and
Hegel, acknowledge that from the time of Aristotle to their own age logic had made no progress.
Aristotle has described the pure forms and operations of abstract reason, of finite thought, with the
accuracy of an investigator of nature, and his logic
is, as it were, a natural history of this " finite
thought."
Aristotle obtains the categories, the fundamental conceptions of thought, from language, in which
these universal forms of thought appear as parts of
speech. These categories (icanTyopiat, also cavqyoppuaTra, 'd KarT-qyopovUeva) give all the possible
definitions for the different modes in which everything that exists may be viewed; they are the
most universal expressions for the relations which
constantly recur in things; fundamental definitions,
which cannot be comprehended under any higher
generic conception, and are, therefore, called,yevr.
Yet they are not themselves generic conceptions,
which give what is essential in an object, but the
most universal modes of expressing it. An independent existence belongs to oaioa, sibstance,
alone of all the categories; the rest denote
only the different modes of what is inherent. The
categories themselves, therefore, are not an ultimatum, by means of which the true cognition of an
object can be attained. The most important proposition in Aristotle's doctrine of substances t is,
that " the universal attains to reality only in the
individual" ( pGn oviav or v iTwv TrpwzTwv ovicrcv
dcSlva'ov Tv CAhhCwv or t eYa).

ARISTOTELES. 335
After substance (ovoria) Aristotle first treats
of quantity, which with that which is relative
attaches to the material of the substance, then
passes to what is qualitative, which has reference
especially to the determination of the form of the
object. (In the Metaphysics on the other hand
(v. 15), where the categories are defined more in
accordance with our conceptions of them, the investigation on the qualitative precedes that on the
relative.) The six remaining categories are treated
of only in short outlines.
The object of the categories is, to render possible the cognition of the enormous multiplicity of
phaenomena; since by means of them those modes of
viewing things which constantly recur in connexion
with existence are fixed, and thus the necessity for
advancing step by step ad infinitum is removed.
But in Aristotle's view they are not the ultimatum
for cognition. They rather denote only the different modes in which anything is inherent in the
substance, and are truly and properly determined
only by means of that which is substantial. This
again is determined by the elbos, which is what is
essential in the material, and owes its existence to
the purpose of the thing. This purpose, and
nothing short of this, is an ultimatum for cognition.
The highest opposition in which the purpose
realises itself is that of Uv'vawfs and eiVreAEXEa.
(Arist. de Anima, ii. c. 1.)
The categories are single words (rad vv a vcTrAoKcis heOydva). As such, they are in themselves neither true nor false. They become both
only in the union of ideas by means of mutual
reference in a proposition (TX icavr ovIt, rA}mJI v
hAyo'eva). A proposition is the expression
(ipUiveta) of reflecting thought, which separates
and combines (bia'PpeSts, a'venorAoK). This operation of thought manifests itself first of all in judgment. In this way Aristotle succeeds in advancing from the categories to the doctrine of the expression of thought (Eppuveia). Here he treats
first of all of the component elements of the proposition, then of simple propositions, together with
the mode of their opposition with reference to the
true and the false; lastly, of compound propositions
(ai ovýrXsJmtetoeyat diropavo'ers), or modal forms of
judgment (ae dirocfdva'eos pera Tpdorov), out of
which the category of modality was afterwards
formed.
In the second part of the treatise rp ipl pyvslas
the different modes of opposition of both kinds of
propositions are discussed. The essence of jdg--
ment, which presents itself in a visible form in the
proposition, consists in this, that the idea, which
in itself is neither true nor false, separates itself
into the momenta peculiar to it, the universal, the
particular, the individual, and that the relation between these momenta is either established by
means of affirmation, or abolished by means of
negation.
Judgment, however, stands in essential relation
to conclusion. In judgment, Universal and Particular are referred to each other; these two momenta of our conceptions separate themselves, with
reference to the conclusion, into two premises
(irpoTaoirss), of which the one asserts the universal,
the other the particular. (Anal. pr. i. 25; To pUv
cWs ',Aov, TO b C 's pipos.) The conclusion itself,
however, is that expression, in which, from certain
premises, something else beyond the premises is
necessarily deduced. But the conclusion is still

"* e0os is the internal formative principle; dp(pn
is the external form itself.
r The rrpdTr7 onaiia expresses the essential qualities only, the BEvre"pat orOaia are substances, including both essential and accidental qualities.