Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

CONCEPTION. 81
in which there is a natural defect of the organ in the perception
of color. In some cases, perhaps, the sensation is not felt at all;
and in others, the faintness of the sensation may be one cause
of those habits of inattention, from which the incapacity of con
ception has arisen.
What uses the power of conception is subservient to. —A
talent for lively description, at least in the case of sensible objects, depends chiefly on the degree in which the describer
possesses the power of conception. We may remark, even in
common conversation, a striking difference among individuals
in this respect. One man, in attempting to convey a notion of
any object he has seen, seems to place it before him, and to
paint from actual perception: another, although not deficient in
a ready elocution, finds himself, in such a situation, confused and
embarrassed among a number of particulars imperfectly apprehended, which crowd into his mind without any just order and
connection. Nor is it merely to the accuracy of our descriptions that this power is subservient: it contributes more than
any thing else to render them striking and expressive to others,
by guiding us to a selection of such circumstances as are most
prominent and characteristical; insomuch that I think it may
reasonably be doubted, if a person would not write a happier
description of an object from the conception than from the actual
perception of it. It has been often remarked, that the perfection
of description does not consist in a minute specification of circumstances, but in a judicious selection of them; and that the best
rule for making the selection is to attend to the particulars that
make the deepest impression on our own minds. When the object is actually before us, it is extremely difficult to compare the
impressions which different circumstances produce; and the very
thought of writing a description, would prevent the impressions
which would otherwise take place. When we afterwards conceive the object, the representation of it we form to ourselves,
however lively, is merely an outline; and is made up of those
circumstances, which really struck us most at the moment;
while others of less importance are obliterated. The impression,
indeed, which a circumstance makes on the mind, will vary