Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

ATTENTION. 71
one subject to another, which indicate, in the mind of the individual who first, made the transference, some perception of resemblance or of' analogy. Such transferences can halrdly be
ascribed to accident, but may be considered as proofs that the
analogies, which the philosopher afterwards points out between
the objects which are distinguished by the same name, had been
perceived by the inventors of language, although it is more than
probable that they never expressed them in words, nor could
even have explained them if they had been questioned on the
subject.
Nor will this appear a bold or incredible supposition, if we
reflect on the sagacity and ingenuity which savages, and even
peasants, discover, in overcoming the difficulties which occur in
their situation. They do not, indeed, engage in long processes
of abstract reasoning, for which they have no inclination, and
which it is impossible to carry on without the use of a cultivated
and a copious language; but when pressed by present circumstances, they combine means to accomplish particular ends, in a
manner which indicates the exercise both of invention and of
reasoning. It is probable that such processes are carried on in
their minds, with much less assistance from language, than a
philosopher would derive on a similar occasion; and it is almost
certain, that they would find themselves perfectly incapable of
communicating to others the steps by which they were led to
their conclusions. In consequence of these circumstances, the
attainments of the human mind, in its ruder state, perish with
the individual, without being recorded in writing, or perhaps
expressed in words; and we are left to infer them indirectly
from the structure of language, or from the monuments of ancient customs and institutions.
What trains of thoughz t are most cbfficult to be remembered.When a train of thought leads to any interesting conclusion, or
excites any pleasant feeling, it becomes peculiarly difficult to arrest our fleeting ideas; because the mind, when once it has felt
the pleasure, has little inclination to retrace the steps by which
it arrived at it. This is one great cause of the difficulty attending
plhilosophical criticism. When a critic explains to us why we