Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

D58'ATTENTXION.
supposition seems to me to be somewhat similar to that of a
man, who should maintain, that, although a body projected with
a moderate velocity is seen to pass through all the intermediate
spaces in moving from one place to another, yet we are not entitled to conclude, that this happens when the body moves so
quickly as to become invisible to the eye. The former supposition is supported by the analogy of many other facts in our
constitution. Of some of these, I have already taken notice;
and it would be easy to add to the number. An expert accountant, for example, can sum up, almost with a single glance of his
eye, a long column of figures. He can tell the sum with unerring certainty; while, at the same time, he is unable to recollect any one of the figures of which that sum is composed: and
yet nobody doubts, that each of these figures has passed through
his mind, or supposes, that when the rapidity of the progress
becomes so great that he is unable to recollect the various steps
of it, he obtains the result by a sort of inspiration. This last
supposition would be perfectly analogous to Dr. Hartley's doctrine concerning the nature of our habitual exertions.
Rapidity of the mind's action. - The, only plausible objection
which, I think, can be offered to the principles I have endeavored to establish on this subject, is founded on the astonishing,
and almost incredible, rapidity they necessarily suppose in our
intellectual operations. When a person, for example, reads
aloud, there must, according to this doctrine, be a separate volition preceding the articulation of every letter; and it has been
phragm. It may not, nevertheless, be thence inferred, that unknowing
nature can act regularly as well as ourselves. The true inference is, that
the self thinking individual, or human person, is not the real author of
those natural motions. And, in fact, no man blames himself, if they are
wrong, or values himself, if they are right. The same may be said of the
fingers of a musician, which some object to be moved by habit, which understands not; it being evident that what is done by rule, must proceed
from something that understands the rule; therefore, if not from the musician himself, from some other active intelligence; the same, perhaps,
which governs bees and spiders, and moves the limbs of those who walk
in their sleep."