Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

EXTERNAL PERC.EPTIXON" 37
and by consequence exists, when and where the body is not;
for it perceives objects distant friom te body both in time and
place." Indeed, if we take for granted, that in perception the
mind acts upon the object, or the object upon the mind, and, at
the same time, admit the truth of the maxim, that " nothing can
act but where it is," we must, of necessity conclude, either that
objects are perceived in a way similar to what is supposed in
the ideal theory, or that, in every act of perception, the soul
quits the body, and is present to the object perceived. And
accordingly, this alternative is expressly stated by Malebralche;
who differs, however, from the writer last quoted, in the choice
which he makes of his hypothesis; and even rests his proof of
its truth on the improbability of the other opinion. " I suppose," says he, " that every one will grant, that we perceive not
external objects immediately, and of themselves. We see the
sun, the stars, and an infinity of objects without us; and it is
not at all likely that, upon such occasions, the soul sallies out of
the body in order to be present to the objects perceived. She
sees them not therefore by themselves; and the immediate object of the mind is not the thing perceived, but something which
is intimately united to the soul; and it is that which I call an
idea: so that by the word idea, I understand nothing else here
but that which is nearest to the mind when we perceive any object. It ought to be carefully observed, that, in order to the
mind's perceiving any object, it is absolutely necessary that the
ideas of that object be actually present to it. Of this it is not
possible to doubt. The things which the soul perceives, are of
two kinds. They are either in the soul, or they are without
the soul. Those that are in the soul, are its own thoughts;
that is to say, all its different modifications. The soul has no
need of ideas for perceiving these things. But with regard to
things without the soul, we cannot perceive them but by means
of ideas."
All these theories appear to me to have taken their rise, ferst,
from an inattention to the'proper object of philosophy, and, secondly, from an apprehension, that we understand the connection
between impulse and motion better than any other physical
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