Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

484 REASONING AND DEDUCTIVE EVIDENTCE.
same way as the undistinguishing perceptions of children or
savages; the familiar use of a generic word insensibly and
irresistibly leading the mind to extend its conclusions from the
individual to the genus, and thus laying the foundation of' conclusions and anticipations, which we suppose to rest on experience, when, in truth, experience has never been consulted.
In all such instances, it is worthy of observation, we proceed
ultimately on the, common principle, - that,in similar circumstances, the same cause will produce the same effects; and
when we err, the source of our error lies merely in identifying
different cases which ouglt to be distinguished from each other.
Great as may be the occasional inconveniences arising from
this general principle thus misapplied, they bear no proportion
to the essential advantages resulting from the disposition, in
which they originate, to arrange and to classify; a disposition
on which (as I have elsewhere shown) the intellectual improvement of' the species in a great manner hinges. That she constitution of our nature in this respect is, on the whole, wisely
ordered, as well as perfectly comformable to the general economy of our frame, will appear from a slight survey of some
other principles, nearly allied to those which are at present
under our consideration.
It has been remarked by some eminent writers in this part
of the island, that our expectation of' the continuance of the
laws of nature has a very close affinity to our faith in human
testimony. The parallel might perhaps be carried, without
any over refinement, a little further than these writers have
attempted; inasmuch as, in both cases, the instinctive principle is in the first instance unlimited, and requires, for its correction and regulation, the lessons of subsequent experience.
As the credulity of children is originally without bounds, and
is afterwards gradually checked by the examples which they
occasionally meet with of human falsehood, so, in the infancy
of our knowledge, whatever objects or events present to our
senses a strong resemblance to each other, dispose us, without
any very accurate examination of the minute details by which
they may be really discriminated, to conclude with eagerness,