Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. By Dugald Stewart. Rev. and abridged, with critical and explanatory notes, for the use of colleges and schools. By Francis Bowen ...

416 REASONING AND DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE.
falls, in no inconsiderable a degree, under this censure; having,
upon more than one occasion, expressed himself as if he conceived it to be possible, by means of precise and definite terms,
to reduce reasoning in all the sciences to a sort of mechanical
operation, analogous in its nature to those which are practised
by the algebraist on letters of the alphabet. "The art of
reasoning (he repeats over and over) is nothing more than a
language well arranged."
One of the first persons, as far as I know, who objected to
the vagueness and incorrectness of this proposition, was M. De
Gerando; to whom we are further indebted for a clear and satisfactory exposition of the very important fact to which it
relates.
"It is the distinguishing characteristic of a lively and vigorous conception," he remarks, "to push its speculative conclusions somewhat beyond their just limits. Hence, in the logical
discussions of' this estimable writer, these maxims, (stated without any explanation or restriction,)'That the study of a science
is nothing more than the acquisition of a language;' and,' that
al science properly treated, is only a language well contrived.'
Hence the rash assertion,' That mathematics possess no advantage over other sciences, but what they derive from a better
phraseology; and that all of these might attain to the same
characters of simplicity and of certainty, if we knew how to
give them signs equally perfect.' "
6The same task which must have been executed by those
who contributed to the first formation of a language, and which
is executed by every child when he learns to speak it, is repeated over in the mind of every adult, when he makes use of
his mother tongue; for it is only by the decomposition of his
thoughts, that he can learn to select the signs which he ought
to employ, and to dispose them in a suitable order. Accordingly, those external actions which we call speaking or writing,
are always accompanied with a philosophical process of the understanding, unless we content ourselves, as too often happens,
with repeating over mechanically what has been said by others.
It is in this respect that languages, with their forms and rules,